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Radio Frequency Spectrum And Use

Package-Type Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Concealed Mortar/Artillery Projectiles







The enemy in Iraq has used IEDs consisting of mortar and artillery projectiles as the explosive device. The most common explosives used are military munitions, usually 122 mm or greater mortar/tank/artillery.

The use and characteristics of these have included the following:

* Thrown from overpasses.
* Thrown in front of approaching vehicles from roadside.
* Usually thrown by males—who are not always adults.
* Emplaced in potholes (covered with dirt).
* Emplaced along MSRs and alternate supply routes (targeting vehicles).
* Employed along unimproved roads (targeting patrols).
* Employed with 120-mm and larger artillery or mortar projectiles.
* Found alone or in groups.
* IEDs behind which are placed cinder blocks or piles of sand to direct blast into the kill zone.
* Command detonated—either by wire or remote device.
* Time-delay triggered IEDs. IEDs that can be detonated by cordless phone from a car (allows for mobile firing platform and prevents tracing or triangulation).

Modified Conventional Munitions

The examples below are all IEDs that have been recovered in Iraq.
Anti-Tank Mine encased in
concrete and command
detonated via remote control

Improvised Off-Route Antitank Mine 500lbs bomb rigged as IED
Artillery shells rigged as IEDs Artillery shell-based IEDs hidden in bags along roads

Artillery shell-based IED hidden in
plaster made to look like a concrete block

FROM: http://www.globalsecurity.org

Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs)

Vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are devices that use a vehicle as the package or container of the device. These IEDs come in all shapes, colors, and sizes which vary by the type of vehicles available — small sedans to large cargo trucks. There have even been instances of what appeared to be generators, donkey drawn carts, and ambulances used to attempt attacks on Coalition Forces and the New Iraqi Government.

Larger vehicles enable larger amounts of explosive that can be used, resulting in a greater effect. Functioning of devices can vary within the same methods as the package types and can have the same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs. VBIEDs have increasingly used larger amounts of explosives, and the explosive charge has ranged anywhere from 100lbs to well over 1000 pounds. The explosive charge has included items such as mortar rounds, rocket motors, rocket warheads, PE4 explosives, and artillery rounds. Functioning of devices can vary within the same methods as the package types and can have the same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs A growing technique in VBIED attacks in Iraq has involved the use of multiple vehicles. In such instances, the lead vehicle is used as a decoy or barrier buster. Once stopped or neutralized and with coalition forces starting to move to inspect or detain – the main VBIED comes crashing though and into the crowd before detonating; thus resulting in an increase of the casualty ratio.

FROM: http://www.globalsecurity.org

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps Locations

Indicators

By definition, booby traps are disguised or well-hidden, victim-activated devices. The initiating object is going to be fairly obvious, as it is the object that the enemy hopes a soldier will interfere with in order to set off the trap. Booby traps rely on an unwary or distracted soldier touching or pulling a physical object (such as a war souvenir) or provide a too-easy access or simple solution to a problem (such as leaving only one door open in an otherwise secure building).

In an operational environment where booby traps have been used, soldiers must be trained to constantly question why things are positioned where they are or why the enemy might have left obvious routes open. The enemy will watch reactions and procedures executed when moving through an area. They will be looking for natural behavior and weaknesses in soldiers' drills. For example, in Vietnam, the Vietcong (VC) noticed soldiers liked to kick empty soda cans that were lying on the ground. It was not long before the US troops found that the VC were leaving explosive devices in empty cans lying alongside regular patrol routes. The devices were activated when the cans were kicked.

Many of the booby trap indicators mirror those of mines. These include areas where the locals do not enter, such as abandoned buildings and attractive items that are usually left alone.

* Electrical wires, batteries, booby traps, and store items (clothes pegs, mouse traps, steel tubes, and springs).
* Isolated boxes and containers along routes.
* Abandoned vehicles, military equipment, weapons, uniforms, and papers.
* Trip wires, string, and cables.
* Disturbed soil and sand.
* Dust.
* Footprint trails that stop suddenly.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps

Firing Devices

In low-intensity, stability and support operations and counterterrorism conflicts, there may be high incidences of improvised devices and booby traps. It is impossible to provide a complete list of firing devices (FDs) and improvised demolition materiel that can be used. Most improvised traps are variations of those described below. Some IEDs can be victim-activated.



Nonelectric FDs. Most nonelectric FDs are based on pressure, pressure release, or trip wire actuation. Improvised FDs are usually of the shear pin or pin removal type. * Improvised electric FDs. An electric FD requires a current to pass between two contacts. The ways in which this can be achieved are unlimited. Booby traps/IEDs utilizing electrical components are limited by having to use a power source. In most cases, the power source will be a battery. The life of this type of booby trap is limited to the life of the battery.

FROM: http://www.globalsecurity.org

Improvised explosive device (IED)

From: Wikipedia

An improvised explosive device (IED; also known as a roadside bomb due to contemporary use) is a homemade bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. One may be constructed of conventional military explosives, such as an artillery round, attached to a detonating mechanism. IEDs may be used in terrorist actions or in unconventional warfare by guerrillas or commando forces in a theater of operations. In the 2003–present Iraq War, IEDs have been used extensively against coalition forces and by the end of 2007 they had become responsible for approximately 40% of coalition deaths in Iraq.[1] They are also the weapon of choice for insurgent groups in the 2001–present Afghanistan War.[2] They were also used extensively by cadres of the rebel Tamil Tiger (LTTE) organization against military and civilian targets in Sri Lanka[3][4] before the LTTE was dismantled in mid 2009 by the Sri Lankan military forces.

Electronic Warfare Capability

Army initiates electronic warfare capability
BY Lt. Col. Carl S. Ey

Sgt. 1st Class Robert Dorneman controls the switch panel to raise the Joint Land Electronic Netted Sensor (J LENS) tower during maintenance at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. The J LENS is used to provide security for Kandahar Airfield. Photo by Sgt. Andre' Reynolds
More Images
WASHINGTON (Army News Service) - The Army is developing a new core competency for career Soldiers and officers interested in becoming electronic warfare specialists."As the Army continues to face an increasingly sophisticated, learning and adaptive enemy, who will engage in asymmetric warfare characterized by irregular tactics, terror, and the use of the most deadly casualty-producing means available to them, we find ourselves needing to develop new ways to attack and defeat these adversaries," said Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

"Tora! Tora! Tora!" ("Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!")

ELINT, Information Operations Helped Japanese Forces Achieve Surprise at Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, air and naval forces of the Empire of Japan struck the US Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and surrounding Army and Navy facilities. Twenty-one ships of the Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged in the attack, including two battleships sunk and six heavily damaged. Nearly 200 US aircraft were destroyed and over 150 damaged, most while still on the ground. Total US casualties amounted to 2,403 dead (68 of which were civilians killed by improperly fuzed anti-aircraft shells) and 1,178 wounded. Nearly 1,800 sailors perished on the battleship USS Arizona alone. Japanese losses amounted to 29 aircraft shot down and five midget submarines sunk or beached: 64 men in all.
The raid commenced when the Japanese cruisers Chikuma and Tone each launched a floatplane about 220 miles north of Oahu at 0530 local time to ascertain the exact anchorage of the US fleet. Twenty minutes later, the carriers of Japan's First Air Fleet, Akagi, Kaga, Hiru, Soryu, Zuikaku, and Shokaku turned into the wind to begin launching approximately 350 fighters and bombers in two waves. The aircraft included Nakajima Type 97 "Kate" level bombers, some armed with torpedoes and others with bombs; Aichi Type 99 "Val" dive bombers; and Mitsubishi Type 0 "Zero" fighters. Cmdr Mitsuo Fuchida, leading the first wave, used a Honolulu radio station broadcasting Hawaiian music to home in on the target. At 0735 the scout plane from Chikuma broke radio silence that had been maintained since the force left Japan twelve days earlier with a report that the US fleet was at its Ford Island anchorage. Fuchida sighted the ships at 0740 and saw that they were sleeping peacefully. As his attack wave divided into smaller units to deliver its ordnance, Fuchida radioed the code words signaling complete surprise had been achieved: "Tora! Tora! Tora!" ("Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!").

Relationship between ESM and SIGINT

The functions of search, intercept, location and analysis are common to both ESM and SIGINT operations. ESM and SIGINT operations are conducted before and during hostilities and can be practised during military exercises. Differences arise in purpose and employment of these functions and the use of the derived information. The purposes, for which operations are performed, and the techniques used to carry them out, are to be the basic criteria for determining whether they are to be described as EW (ESM) or SIGINT operations. There must be close coordination between ESM and SIGINT operations, particularly when separate assets are employed, to ensure duplication of effort or conflict of interests is avoided.

Definition of SIGINT

SIGINT is a huge sphere of operations and as you would imagine it is rather difficult to define it in a short simple statement. SIGINT can be described as all the processes and techniques required to intercept and study foreign communications and RADAR EM emissions during peacetime and in support of military operations before and during hostilities. The following is a suggested and acceptable definition:

“Sigint is the intelligence communications intelligence (comint) and electronic information derived from intelligence (elint)”

Signals Intelligence and ESM

There is an undeniable relationship between EW and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which can lead to confusion and misinterpretation. The relationship between EW and SIGINT in the most part is relevant only to ESM. SIGINT comprises of 2 main elements: Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). In simple terms and to a large extent, COMINT and ELINT mirror the EW functional areas of CESM and RESM. Generally, EW is conducted by the military, using military equipment and for military purposes on military operations, whereas SIGINT is generally undertaken by intelligence organisations. Intelligence organisations are usually a combination of military and civilian personnel and their SIGINT missions can be undertaken outside the scope of military operations. SIGINT is normally more strategic in nature, and source protection is a major factor in classification levels. EW is tactical, however there is normally a vital need for SIGINT support to military operations and therefore the relationship between both needs to be understood and taken into consideration during all planning phases on operations.

COMINT and ELINT data provide much of the information needed for successful prosecution of EW, for example emitter databases. Furthermore, the use of commercial communications technology developed for military use means that SIGINT and EW are frequently engaged in technically similar target arrays. Most nations now have close links and robust communications between the 2 disciplines.

ESM Characteristics and Activities

The following are the key characteristics of ESM:
• It is used only during crisis and war. During peacetime, EW and ESM will interact with SIGINT and benefit from its product, in particular building of databases.

• It is one of the few tactical information gathering systems which has the potential to provide cover to the limit of the Force Commander’s area of interest
• It provides all weather, day/night, long-range information gathering systems at the operational and tactical level monitoring activity in the EM environment
• It exploits an adversary’s EM emissions and can provide information on the adversary’s capabilities and intentions
• It is offensive and passive, but be aware that its C2 systems can produce a unique signature that can be exploited by adversary EW
• It is a non-intrusive method of signals collection

1.8.7. ESM Activities

During the initial stages of a crisis or during preparations for war, EW efforts are stepped-up in an effort to improve knowledge and readiness. In this respect ESM activities will increase in tempo and focus. The immediate threat will become the priority. The following activities, therefore, usually take place:
• Individual nations, if on a Combined operation, may put increased emphasis on updating the technical parameters of all communications and non-communications systems in their area of interest.
• Creation of own and friendly EOBs to ensure interoperability of systems and reduce potential for fratricide. The Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell (EWCC) must be kept informed of friendly EOBs, specific equipment parameters and changes made. Own and friendly EOB information will be correlated with known adversary EOBs to create a consolidated Area of Operations (AO) EOB.
• Development and production of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Rules of Engagement (ROE), and any specific “Actions On” for the operation. For Combined operations, higher level Memorandums of Understanding and Agreement will provide the mechanism to exchange nationally held data.

Picture from http://www.cotsjournalonline.com/

ESM process: search, intercept, direction finding (DF) and analysis

There are 3 main functions associated with ESM and they are shown along with the 4 sub-divisions of the ESM process: search, intercept, direction finding (DF) and analysis. The end product of this process will provide vital information and intelligence on the adversary, such as the establishment of an adversary’s EOB, strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, reactions and intentions.

Search

Search involves the reconnaissance of the EM spectrum for adversary emissions. An experienced EW operator will scan through the EM spectrum having already been informed on targets (transmissions) of interest to the J2 Intelligence Staff. Upon detection of a target of interest, the frequency will be passed to an EW intercept operator for further exploitation. Although this process can be quite slow, modern automated wide-band search receivers have now made it possible to scan portions of the Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum to identify active targets of interest.

Intercept

The intercept process further classifies the emission by both its external characteristics (RF, modulation etc) and the internal information if available. If the emission is encrypted, very little internal information is likely to be available. The EW intercept operator will log as much information as possible extracting all potential intelligence. A transmission using clear voice will have a log of its activity made by the EW intercept operator detailing what was said, however when done live, it is very unlikely that full (verbatim) copy will be possible. Realistically, the EW intercept operator ill log or “gist” only the most relevant information (locations, intentions, reactions etc) but good practice is to make a recording that allows further extraction of information following a full transcript of the activity in slower time.

Direction Finding (DF)

An emitter’s location can be obtained using the DF technique. This involves measuring the bearing at which the target signal arrives at a specialist EW DF receiver. If only one DF station is used then a line of bearing (LOB) is produced. This will provide only the direction to the transmitter but will not actually locate the target unless the distance from the DF sensor is known, which is unlikely. Two DF sensors will provide a better indication of where the target transmitter is located; however it is best practice to deploy 3 or more sensors to provide a fairly accurate location of the target. This is called Position Fixing (PF). When 3 or more sensors each provide their LOB, an ellipse can be drawn on a map, in which there is an approximate 90% chance the target is located.

Optimum accuracy of a DF system is approximately 1 degree, however at longer distances accuracy can vary up to 3 degrees and even more at the very limit of the target being audible. At distances of 30-50 km the target location ellipse will be quite large and this precludes DF being used for Target Acquisition. However, even at 3 degrees variation, DF is useful to cue other ISTAR resources to determine a more accurate target location. Figs 7 and 8 below show a typical land-based EW deployment of 4 DF sensors attempting to PF an enemy transmission and an aircraft attempting the same PF using a “rolling” baseline

Direction Finding & Position Fixing
Aircraft Direction Finding & Position




























Analysis of EM emissions is carried out for multiple objectives, which include:

· . Adversary’s intentions

· . Adversary’s response to own or friendly Information Operations (INFO OPS)

· . Affects of own or friendly ECM operations

· . Establishment of a comprehensive EOB

· . Targeting for kinetic action

The analysis of traffic collected by ESM sensors should, if at all possible, be fused with other intelligence Sources and Agencies (SANDA). There is a “special” relationship between EW and SIGINT and product from both can be similar and complimentary, but fusing Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and / or Human Intelligence (HUMINT) for example, will give much greater granularity and credibility to the information derived from the ESM intercept and DF. The fusion of all the information by the J2 All Sources Cell (ASC) can provide crucial intelligence to the J3 Staff in order to allow the Commander to make key decisions.