Sharper Night Vision

Sharper Night Vision

November 27, 2011: Two years after U.S. Army troops began receiving the first new helmet mounted ENVGs (Enhanced Night Vision Goggle), another major improvement has shown up; SENVG (Spiral Enhanced Night Vision Goggles). The main improvement with SENVG is a much sharper, true-color image. Troops who tested them did not want to give them up. But fewer than a thousand SENVG are on order so far. Demand is expected to skyrocket once more troops in Afghanistan get these devices.

The ENVGs were so successful that the army ordered 50,000, so that all troops in a combat zone can have them. The ENVG were particularly useful spotting for hidden (in the brush) enemy gunmen at night. Troops equipped with ENVG have a 50 percent probability of spotting these hidden hostiles at 300 meters and an 80 percent probability at 150 meters. This made it much more difficult for enemy fighters to ambush American troops at night. Since the enemy rarely has night vision gear, they have to rely on sound and fleeting glimpses of the approaching Americans. That means the U.S. troops have to be less than 50 meters away before the enemy can open fire. The ENVG thus provides a crucial edge at night. This has been great for American morale, not so good for the Taliban. The SENVG goggles simply increase the American edge.

What made the ENVG so popular was that it combines the older light enhancement technology goggles, with a thermal (heat sensing) night sight. This combined sight weighs about one kilogram (two pounds). The older ENVG (thermal only) weighed 864 gr (1.9 pounds), while the AN/PVS-13 light enhancing device weighed 568 gr (1.25 pounds), for a total of nearly a kilogram (2.15 pounds). The new sight is not only lighter, but more compact and easier to use. It provides a total of 15 hours' use (7.5 hours for thermal imaging and the same for light enhancement). In most cases (where there is some star or moon light) the light enhancement sight will do. But where there is no other light (as in a building or cave) the thermal imager works. The thermal imager also works through fog and sand storms.

It was five years ago that field testing of the original ENVG (the AN/PAS13) took place. This device worked with the current AN/PVS-14 night vision goggles (which provide night vision by enhancing available light), but added the capability to use thermal imaging (seeing differences in heat). As more combat moved to Afghanistan, the ENVG became more critical for battlefield success at night.

Until a decade ago, thermal imaging equipment was large and bulky and only available in vehicles (M-1 tanks and M-2 Bradleys). But in the last five years, smaller and lighter thermal imagers have come on to the market. The U.S. Army Special Forces has been using these lightweight thermal imagers to great effect from the very beginning of their development.

Field testing of the combined device began three years ago, and was quickly found to be popular and reliable. The earlier thermal imager was also very popular, but carrying both night sights was not. At first, the plan was not to equip all combat troops with the more expensive combined sight. That soon changed once user reports came back, praising the ENVG and describing how much of a life-saver it was. Not all non-combat troops will have an ENVG, but every unit will have some. The army found the money ($770 million) to buy over 50,000 of the new ENVGs, which cost about $15,000 each. It takes a while to manufacture these devices, and the army will only have about 10,000 of them by next year.

The SENVGs are equally expensive and difficult to produce. If past experience is any guide, special operations troops (Special Forces and SEALs) will be the first to get them. The new technology in Spiral Enhanced Night Vision Goggles will be included in weapons sights as well.

Taiwan AWACS Enhanced

Taiwan AWACS Enhanced

November 20, 2011: Taiwan is sending another two of its E-2T AWACS aircraft to the U.S. for upgrading to the E-2C 2000 standard. Two Taiwanese E-2Ts were sent last year. The upgrade will cost about $63 million per aircraft.

The E-2T is very similar to the E-2C. Meanwhile, it was only last year that the U.S. Navy received its first E-2D aircraft. This is the latest version of the E-2 Hawkeye radar aircraft that was originally introduced in 1964. The two engine, 24 ton E-2 was never produced in large quantities (fewer than a hundred are in use). Four years ago, the E-2 fleet reached a milestone, of a million flight hours.

The current E-2C models began entering service in the 1970s and are difficult to maintain because of their age. The E-2s always contained a large quantity of the most modern, and failure prone, electronics. Operating mostly off carriers, and thus constantly exposed to corrosive, salty ocean air, the aircraft takes a beating. The five man crew is mostly concerned with using the large radar carried atop the aircraft, and keeping track of friendly, and hostile, aircraft and missiles at up to 400 kilometers distance.

The aircraft can stay in the air for 4-6 hours at a time, and cruises at 450 kilometers an hour. Currently, the three "system operators" use large flat screen displays and many gigabytes of disk storage each (for capturing and comparing data) to operate as a sea-going AWACS. It was the navy that developed the AWACS concept at the end of World War II, using Avenger light bombers, equipped with radar, to control large carrier strikes.

Each American aircraft carrier has four E-2s, and the U.S. Navy has a total fleet of about 70 E-2s. There are several dozen in service in other countries, but only France operates them from carriers. Everyone else uses land based E-2s. About half the E-2s ever built are still flying, and the United States expects to keep using them (as the E-2D) into the 2020s. After that, an unmanned aircraft will probably replace the E-2.

The E-2C 2000 entered service eight years ago, as an interim upgrade before the E-2D (with new engines, new phased array radar, new electronics and many other improvements) arrived. Development and manufacturing of 75 E-2Ds for the U.S. Navy cost about $206 million per aircraft. The E-2D has longer range, and more accurate radar as well as much more efficient and reliable computer systems. Many of the current E-2Cs will get some of the electronics improvements, depending on how much money is available. The first carrier to be equipped with E-2Ds won't happen for another 2-3 years. In the meantime, individual E-2Ds will operate from carriers to work out any remaining bugs and unforeseen problems.

Apache Enters The Block III Era

Apache Enters The Block III Era

November 12, 2011: The U.S. Army has received the first of 51 "low rate initial production" Block III models of the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunship. This is the newest version of the AH-64, and had its first flight three years ago. The U.S. Army will be upgrading all of its 634 AH-64s to the new Block III standard, a process that won't be completed until 2020. The first Block IIIs are entering service now, and will be heavily used to reveal any design or manufacturing flaws. These will be fixed before mass production and conversion begins. 

Block III has a lot of improvements. One of the notable ones is a more powerful and fuel efficient engine, as well as much improved electronics. Block III will also have Internet like capabilities with other aircraft and ground troops. Block III will be able to control several UAVs, and launch missiles at targets spotted by its UAVs. The Block III radar will have longer range and onboard computers will be much more powerful. The electronics will be easier to upgrade and maintain. The combination of improved fire control and Internet capabilities is expected to greatly increase the capabilities of the AH-64.

The 7.5 ton AH-64D carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles (plus the 30mm automatic cannon). Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour.

In addition to the U.S. Army, the Block III is also being bought by the UAE (United Arab Emirates) which is buying 60. Neighboring Saudi Arabia recently ordered 70 of the same model, as well as upgrades for its existing twelve AH-64s, to the Block III standard. Many other of the existing 1,100 AH-64s may be upgraded as well.

 

Slow, Sloppy and Stubborn

November 10, 2011: India's submarine fleet is dying of old age, and new boats are not going to arrive in time. It's not like this was a surprise, but the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy has long been noted as slow, sloppy and stubborn, especially in the face of demands that it speed up. The twisted tale of the tardy submarines is particularly painful.

The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) six of them in service by then. The other six might arrive five years later. It's hard to say, because the manufacturer of the second six has not been selected yet. The defense procurement nabobs speak of "fast track" for this project, but long-time observers of these officials are not expecting speed.

India's effort to build the first six subs (French Scorpenes), under license, has been delayed several times, and the price has gone up to $5 billion ($834 million each). While this effort will leave India with thousands of workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines, all that will be wasted because the defense procurement bureaucrats seem to have learned nothing. These officials already caused numerous delays, and cost overruns, during negotiations to build the Scorpene diesel-electric submarines. The bureaucrats mismanaged this deal to the extent that it is nearly three years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule if you count the several years the Indian bureaucrats delayed it even getting started. The delays and mismanagement have so far increased the cost of the $4 billion project by 25 percent. The first Scorpene is supposed to enter service in 2015 years, with one a year after that until all six are delivered.

There's some urgency to all this, because by next year, five of India's 16 subs (10 Kilo and two Foxtrot class Russian built boats and four German Type 209s) will be retired (some are already semi-retired because of age and infirmity). Two years after that, India will only have five working subs. India believes it needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and China.

But the bureaucrats and politicians dithered for nearly a decade, and it wasn't until 2005 that India signed a deal to buy six French Scorpene class boats. The delays led to the French increasing prices on some key components, and India has had some problems in getting production going on their end. The first Scorpene was to be built in France, with the other five built in India. While some problems were expected (India has been doing license manufacturing of complex weapons for decades), the defense ministry procurement bureaucrats never ceased to amaze when it came to delaying work, or just getting in the way.

The Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French) that Pakistan recently bought. The first of the Agostas was built in France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a more recent design, the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a 36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes and/or anti-ship missiles carried.) The Scorpene is a little heavier (1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32) and is a little faster. It has six 533mm torpedo tubes, and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system. This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). The Pakistanis have an option to retrofit AIP in their current two Agostas.

While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as the primary adversary. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the Pakistani boats, both because of less advanced technology, and less well trained crews. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will be nearly a decade before all six of the Scorpenes are in service. At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about 20 percent of them nuclear.

Building The Battlefield Tablet

Building The Battlefield Tablet

November 14, 2011: The U.S. Army is developing a tablet computer for battlefield use. Because the iPad is too large to be used on the battlefield, a smaller (18cm/7 inch versus 26cm/10.1 inch) Android model is the favorite. The current plan is to add several layers of security (require fingerprint or face/voice recognition) to the existing password requirement. Battlefield tablets and cell phones also need hardware and/or software to handle the additional wireless security required. This is not a big problem, but developing and testing a system that works well enough to be useful in combat takes time.

Another problem is that troops are often wearing gloves on the battlefield. But in many cases fingerless gloves get the job done, and allow touch sensitive tablets to be used. Field tests have already found that the devices (tablets and cell phones) are quite rugged, especially if covered by the inexpensive (under $10) protective "skins" you can buy anywhere. The troops are big users of tablets, and often create job-specific software for them.

Laser Is Cheaper Than Lead

Laser Is Cheaper Than Lead

November 1, 2011: Over the last decade, the U.S. has developed revolutionary training technology and techniques for combat shooting. First it was the use of electronic rifle ranges, and now it has expanded to outdoor versions, where troops use laser equipped rifles to shoot at 3-D popup, stationary targets or even moving vehicles and personnel. These portable Targetry Systems can easily be set up anywhere, in open or urban areas. Using laser weapons (identical to those developed in the 1980s for combat training), there is no danger to the troops or anyone else in the area.

In addition to providing a lot more weapons training, these electronic systems save a lot of money. The U.S. Marine Corps has saved over half a billion dollars in the last five years, by using indoor electronic firing ranges. IMST (Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer) has cost over $200 million, but the savings in ammo, wear on weapons, and running outdoor ranges were much larger. Nearly 200,000 marines have undergone marksmanship training using IMST. Unlike the similar U.S. Army EST system, IMST is wireless. A special ammo magazine contains gas that provides realistic recoil and a wireless radio device connects the weapon to the targets displayed on the screen and records how accurately the electronic rounds were fired. Wireless systems like this also make the targetry systems possible, because an important aspect of all this is keeping track of every "shot" fired, and where it landed. This provides valuable feedback for the trainees, on what works, and what doesn't.

Devices like IMST and EST have boosted the shooting skills of troops, while reducing costs. This gives American riflemen a big battlefield advantage. In most armies, the troops rarely fire their rifles. Ammo is too expensive (given the meager military budget). When there is combat, the troops are issued bullets, which they fire very inaccurately. Against a better trained foe, this leads to quick defeat. Happens all the time. But now cash strapped armies can train their troops to be effective marksmen without spending a lot of money, by using simulators.

The U.S. Army pioneered this with their EST (Engagement Skills Trainer) 2000 system. Each of these consists of a movie theater size screen (but at ground level, not raised) with back projection target situations displayed as interactive movies. The troops use rifles, pistols and machine-guns that are actual weapons, but modified to fire "electronic bullets", and, via a thin cable, use a pneumatic system that provides recoil as well. There is a sound system to depict the sound of the weapons firing, as well as a computer controlled tracking of ammo fired, letting users know when they have to reload.

Because EST and IMST are simulators, they capture a precise record of exactly where the shooter's weapon is aimed, how well the shooter pulls the trigger, and how long it takes to find and fire at the next target. This enables instructors to much more rapidly detect problems troops are having, and correct them. Tests have shown that you can take people with no weapons experience, put them through four hours of simulator training, and take them to a rifle range, and they will be able to fire accurately enough to exceed military requirements. Studies have shown that troops trained with a simulator gain as much marksmanship skill as those using live ammo.

In addition, a simulator like this can be used for training troops in ways that are impractical using live ammo. For example, when used for "shoot/don't shoot" situations, the appropriate visuals (either an enemy soldier or a civilian) are shown on the video screen. Soldiers train in a group, positioned as they would be in a real situation. The scenario then plays out, allowing the troops to practice when they should shoot, and when they should not. Training can be for day or night scenarios, and for a wide variety of situations.

These systems are sometimes built into standard shipping containers, so they can be moved around to where they are needed. The more useful of these "sims in a box" are the "encounter" and "convoy" sims. The encounter sim puts troops in a container containing video screens on three sides that portray an encounter between troops and foreign civilians (as they would encounter on patrol or manning a checkpoint). The troops are then allowed to deal with typical problems encountered in situations like this. While not combat (although some gunfire can be introduced), it is extremely useful training for troops headed for the combat zone.

A nation like China can build EST like systems for less than $100,000. But the Chinese have traditionally spent more time training their infantry to move quietly and pay attention to camouflage. These are important combat skills, which most nations do not spend a lot of time on. But when it comes time to shoot someone, you have an edge if your troops are accurate. China has been building aircraft and vehicle simulators. Operating warplanes and tanks is very expensive, and simulators are a much cheaper way to give operators useful experience.

In the West, there has been a lot more development of non-combat simulators in the last few decades. This has pushed total worldwide simulator sales to over $8 billion a year (out of total defense sales of $1,100 billion). Operators of electronic equipment are much more effective if they have lots of experience. But actually using their radars, sonars or complex missile systems is also very expensive. So simulators provide essential experience inexpensively.

Most nations can appreciate the need to train their pilots, ship crews and electronics operators to be better at their jobs. But ground combat troops are another matter. In most nations, the army exists mainly to protect the leadership from the population. The troops tend to get frequent training for riot control. Issuing them a lot of ammo is not considered wise, as soldiers in these countries are not considered particularly reliable. So even in military affairs, political expediency trumps everything else.

Chinese Remote Weapons Stations

Chinese Remote Weapons Stations

November 2, 2011: A Chinese firm is marketing a RWS (Remote Weapon Stations). This one is similar to the light (74 kg/163 pounds) model used by the U.S. Army. The Chinese RWS is apparently not meant for vehicle use, but for facility or perimeter security. The Chinese RWS is shown mounting a light (5.8mm) machine-gun and touted for "counter-terror" missions. China is playing catch-up in this area, as Western nations have been developing RWS for decades. The Chinese have developed a vehicle mounted RWS, but is described as still in development. This RWS is armed with a 12.7mm machine-gun and two anti-aircraft missiles. While the missiles are unusual for an RWS, the control systems look familiar to Western RWS operators. The same video game features are used. China also has millions of young men with lots of video game experience.

The U.S. Army continues to improve its RWS systems. These devices allow an operator inside the vehicle to control the gun and its sensors. Among the improvements are the addition of a green laser, which can temporarily blind people, and has long been used to stop drivers who keep coming at checkpoints despite other signals to stop. Used in an RWS, it would enable the RWS operator to flash suspicious people with the blinding light, rather than opening up with the weapon. Another upgrade is the addition of cameras to the side and rear of the turret, so that the operator can quickly check for activity all around without moving the turret (which sometimes alerts an enemy that they have been spotted.) Another addition is an IR Pointer, which, at night, enables the RWS operator to put a light, visible only to those using night-vision equipment, on something suspicious, or otherwise important. The larger CROWS II RWS has also been equipped and tested with a Javelin missile launcher. The army sees RWS as a key element in the development of remotely controlled, or autonomous, armored vehicles. The Chinese RWS does not have any of these features. But some, like the green laser, could easily be added.

RWS was one of the most important (in terms of saving lives) new weapons to appear in the last decade. This now ubiquitous remote control weapon (usually a machine-gun) is seen on many vehicles (from hummers to MRAPs and tanks). The U.S. Army has bought, or plans to buy, a total of 18,000 RWS systems. The army currently has 7,600 RWS in service. An RWS turret costs, on average, about $212,000 each. The remote control gun turret has now become a standard system on American combat vehicles.

Norwegian firm Kongsberg, the major supplier, has several models of its Protec RWS, to support small, medium and large sized weapons. Now there are a lot of competitors, if only because Kongsberg can't keep up with the demand. Many of the new competitors are trying to grab niche markets. The more obvious ones are those demanding RWS that can handle larger weapons, like 25mm or 30mm autocannon. But the most interesting new development is the portable RWS. It can be mounted on a hummer, but quickly removed, and carried by two troops, and set up anywhere using a tripod. The operator can stay behind cover, while the light machine-gun, exposed to hostile fire, unflinchingly takes on the enemy. There are lots of combat situations that could make use of this lightweight RWS.

The Protec RWS is the key component of the U.S. Army CROWS (common remotely operated weapon stations). This idea of a remote control turret has been around for nearly half a century, but years of tinkering, and better technology, have made the remote control gun turret finally work effectively, dependably and affordably. This has made the RWS practical for widespread combat use. While some troops miss the greater feeling of situational awareness (especially being able to hear and smell the surroundings) you got as an old-school turret gunner, most soldiers and marines have adapted and accepted the new system. What it lacks in the smelling and hearing department, it makes up in terms of night vision and zoom. And it's a lot safer.

CROWS is a real life saver, not to mention anxiety reducer, for troops who drive through bandit country a lot, and man the turret gun. You're a target up there, and too often, the bad guys get you. Not with CROWS. The gunner is inside the vehicle, checking out the surroundings (with night vision, zoom and telephoto capabilities). CROWS also has a laser rangefinder built in, as well as a stabilizer mechanism to allow more accurate fire while the vehicle is moving. The CROWS systems (RWS, weapon and installation) cost about $260,000 each, and can mount a variety of weapons (M2 12.7mm/.50 caliber machine-gun, MK19 40-mm automatic grenade launcher, M240B 7.62mm machine-gun and M249 5.56mm squad automatic weapon). CROWS comes in several different configurations, based on weapon mounted and armor installed (light, at 74 kg/163 pounds, standard, at 136 kg/298 pounds and CROWS II, at 172 kg/379 pounds.) The heaviest version is usually used in MRAP (armored trucks) and has a better user interface, a thermal imager and sniper detection system.

The Chinese system offered for sale is more similar to Israeli use of RWS, in turrets guarding the long border with Gaza. The Chinese RWS might be pitched to the many Chinese firms setting up mines and industrial facilities in Africa and parts of Asia that are prone to criminal gangs that carry out large scale raids. Multiple RWS systems would be a deterrent to such attacks.

By the end of 2006, there were about a thousand CROWS in U.S. service. There are now nearly 8,000. Many of the enemy fighters have seen Western or Japanese films featuring killer robots, and often think that's what they are facing. The fear factor is real, and it helps. The accuracy of the fire, and uncanny speed with which the CROWS gun moves to point at a target, is due to something few officers expected; so many troops who quickly become expert RWS operators. The guys operating these systems grew up playing video games. They developed skills in operating computer systems (video games) very similar to the CROWS controls. This was important, because viewing the world around the vehicle via a vidcam is not as enlightening (although a lot safer) than having your head and chest exposed to the elements (and any firepower the enemy sends your way). But experienced video gamers are skilled at whipping that screen view around, and picking up any signs of danger.

Since many troops have years of experience with video games, they take to CROWS quickly, and very effectively. This has further frightened hostile gunmen, who are quick to attribute magical qualities to American equipment. However, many CROWS users have mixed feelings about the system, because they know that you have more awareness of your surroundings if you are actually standing with your head and shoulders outside the vehicle, manning a machine-gun. For this reason, RWS manufacturers are investigating adding more sensors (for things like sound, smell and wind direction.) But the biggest improvements have been more reliability, ease-of-use, more sensors and lower cost.

The Rise Of the Illusion

The Rise Of the Illusion

October 25, 2011: The mass media is having a good time with the idea that several hundred Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk herald an unprecedented age of robot surveillance and destruction. Actually, it's a practice that has been present for thousands of years, and one that, like everything else in the last century, is taking advantage of new technology.

It's all about information. Warfare grew out of hunting, and hunting was all about information. Namely, where the prey was and where it was headed. To this day, hunters who have learned to read the signs (detect spoor, the term for the signs any critter leaves behind) and follow it, are more likely to bring home the fresh meat. As hunting evolved into warfare, the ability to track gave your side an edge. This evolved into espionage, but it was all about correctly noting and interpreting signs that were, well, just there. Be they footprints, bent grass, marks on trees or rocks, or gossip in a market place, those who could collect and sort out the spoor, had an edge.

The military first saw aircraft as a better way to collect information. Combat (shooting at other aircraft and bombing ground targets) came later. What UAVs do is allow you to keep aircraft over an area of interest more cheaply. But just because these aircraft are unmanned does not mean they are robots. They are controlled from the ground. In the past, the pilot and observer were on board, which required a larger and more expensive aircraft, which could not stay in that air as long as an unmanned one. What made the modern UAV possible is cheaper, smaller and more reliable cameras, computers and communications gear.

Commanders have always wanted more aerial reconnaissance, and until UAVs came along, it was too expensive to put as many recon aircraft up there as were needed for "persistent" (continuous) surveillance. Now that they have it, those ignorant of history see something sinister. That's nothing new, but that's another story.

What you will see evolving out of the current UAVs is more software to handle the tedious job of constantly scanning the ground for something useful. This software has been around for over a decade, and is slowly being incorporated into analyzing all sorts of digital video feeds. In factories, it looks for unsafe work habits. In stores, it looks for shoplifters, and shopping patterns. In hospitals, it monitors patients, especially unconscious ones, for signs of trouble, or improvement. In police work, the software can scan through thousands of hours of video for clues and suspects. On the battlefield, scanning software looks for signs of the enemy, and what they are up to.

But people still create the software, and interpret the results. People still fly the robotic aircraft, with the help of the same kind of automatic pilot software long used in manned aircraft. Thus it's not an ominous development we are witnessing, just history in action. Trends happen more quickly these days, and not just for consumer electronics.

American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

October 21, 2011: Pakistan has bought the American ALQ-211 AIDEWS (Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite) pod for their F-16 fighters. The ALQ-211 allows the aircraft to detect radar, jamming and laser signals hitting the aircraft, as well as the presence of chemical weapons. ALQ-211 also provides some jamming of its own, and assistance on where the signal is coming from, so the pilot can move the aircraft away from the threat. ALQ-211 is also installed in helicopters, but not as a pod. Rather, the individual components are installed in the helicopter where space is available.

The ALQ-211 has been service for a decade, and there have been several upgrades and variants. Foreign customers do not get an ALQ-211 with the same capabilities that American aircraft receive. Components of ALQ-211 are programmable, so that the system can quickly be updated for newly discovered enemy equipment. Pakistan will receive ALQ-211(V)9 (version 9), which costs about $3.5 million per pod.

Saving Sentinel

Saving Sentinel

October 22, 2011: Britain's RAF (Royal Air Force) is faced with major budget cuts over the next five years. One of the systems selected for deactivation, the new Sentinel R1 ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar), is now collecting many fervent RAF and army fans calling for this aircraft to remain in service. That's because of how successful Sentinel has been in Afghanistan. Britain recognizes this, and plans to retire Sentinel only after 2015, when British ground troops are scheduled to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The RAF has been told they could more inexpensively replicate Sentinel functions in a UAV. But with all these cuts, the RAF does not see getting enough money to develop a UAV Sentinel replacement. It cost $1.5 billion to develop Sentinel and build five of them and army commanders believe they would be invaluable in any future operations.
It was only three years ago, after a decade of development, that Sentinel aircraft were sent to Afghanistan. Sentinel is similar to the three decade old U.S. E-8 JSTARS. But instead of mounting the radar and computers in a four engine jet transport (the 707), the British used a 44 ton Canadian Bombadier Global Express twin engine business jet. The highly automated Sentinel has two pilots, and three people in the back running the surveillance equipment. Sentinel operates at about 15,000 meters (45-50,000 feet) and can track vehicles, or even people, on the ground up to 160 kilometers away. Large vehicles (like missile transporters/launchers) can be tracked at twice that range. Sorties in Afghanistan average about nine hours, although the aircraft is capable of staying in the air for 14 hours. The U.S. has been using its E-8 ground radar aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan with great success.

Sentinel uses a U.S. made Raytheon ASARS-2 radar. This is a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system that can focus on a smaller area and provide photo quality images. Sentinel also has a large array of electronic warfare equipment and counter-missile systems. But in Afghanistan it mainly uses its radar, and its satellite and ground communications links to send images to the troops below, who can then run down known or suspected hostiles.

In Afghanistan, Sentinel has also been used for intelligence work (to determine normal traffic patterns in an area, and to alert combat commanders when abnormal traffic shows up), and to track enemy vehicles. The Taliban typically move around in trucks and SUVs, and sometimes on motorcycles. All can be tracked by Sentinel, in any weather. Since Sentinel operates at high altitudes, it is out-of-sight and silent to the Taliban below, who never know when they are being tracked.

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

October 17, 2011: It recently came to light that the U.S. Air Force base where most air force UAV operators are stationed had been infected. This led to speculation about hackers taking control of American UAVs. All air force Predator and Reaper UAVs are operated, via satellite, from this one base in the United States. 

All this was bad reporting. Key loggers are distributed to steal information, not seize control of UAVs. Key loggers secretly record everything typed on the infected PCs keyboard, and send it to the hacker who planted the key logger program. The malware that had gotten into the air base network was a actually credential theft program, not a key logger. Credential theft involves stealing login information (user ID and password), in this case the program was aimed at stealing such information for online games.

The air force initially refused to discuss the situation, and the media was left with what little rumor and gossip there was coming from air force personnel. To halt the speculation that this was some kind of major data breach, the air force eventually provided the details, which showed the combination of rumor, paranoia and poor reporting led to a great, if inaccurate, story.

Normally, the air force likes to keep details of these incidents, so that the people trying to penetrate air force networks (for whatever reason) don't get any useful feedback on how well, or not, there penetration attempt went.

Twilight Vision

Twilight Vision

October 18, 2011: After a decade of effort, the U.S. Army believes it has found the final element for the new fire control system for its AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships. Called Arrowhead, it uses the latest night vision devices (light enhancement and thermal, or heat, based) and fire control electronics to enable AH-64 crews to operate more safely, and effectively, at lower altitudes and in any weather. This is particularly critical in urban areas. As AH-64s were equipped with Arrowhead over the last two years, and sent into action, reports started coming back about one weakness; difficulty using the night sensors in low-light (pre-dawn and dusk) conditions. A solution was quickly found in a 900 gram (two pound) VNsight sensor. This small item combined night vision and visible light to present the pilots with a more accurate view of what's out there in the murk.

Work on Arrowhead got a boost after the Iraq invasion in 2003, which was followed by a growing amount of urban fighting. This created the need for an AH-64 that could hover at 800 meters (2,500 feet) altitude (safe from most small arms fire) and use its high resolution sensors to see who was doing what for out to eight kilometers (five miles) away. Arrowhead could do that, and now all AH-64s have Arrowhead, and many transport helicopters are getting it as well, to make night flying safer.

Over a decade earlier, the army developed another advanced fire control system for their AH-64s, Longbow. But this system was designed for the original mission; flying at higher altitudes, looking for and destroying distant enemy armored vehicles. The Longbow allowed the AH-64 to go after armored vehicles at night and in bad weather. In the past, potential American enemies practiced moving their armor at night and bad weather, to avoid helicopters armed with long range missiles (like Hellfire or TOW). Longbow was doubly lethal because it was designed to avoid giving away its position when using its radar. AH-64s also had electronic countermeasures. Arrowhead, on the other hand, made night and bad weather deadly for enemy troops thinking they could sneak through urban areas unobserved. Longbow could not spot these guys, but Arrowhead could, and did, except in some low light conditions. But with VNsight, that is no longer a problem.

The 7.5 ton AH-64D carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles (plus the 30mm automatic cannon). Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour

Towed Vision

October 12, 2011: The U.S. Army has purchased 56 AN/MPQ-64F1 air surveillance radars. These systems, weighing six tons, are carried in a trailer that is towed by a hummer (which also carries an electricity generator). A crew of two operates the radar, which can be set up in under twenty minutes. Max range, even for small targets like cruise missiles and UAVs, is about 75 kilometers. Older AN/MPQ 64s had a range of 40 kilometers, and these are being upgraded. Max altitude is 20 kilometers (63,000 feet). This is a 3-D, 360 degree radar that revolves once every two seconds. The army already has a hundred of these radars, and plans to use them for another two decades.

Smart Phones At War

Smart Phones At War
October 5, 2011: As quickly as the U.S. Army is moving to develop and adopt a battlefield smart phone, it is actually just trying to keep up with its troops. Civilian firms (both defense oriented and otherwise) have noted this troop interest and quickly come up with solutions to problems the army believes are in the way of deploying a battlefield smart phone. These proposals include solutions for security and lack of a signal. The big problem the army has is not a lack of solutions, but figuring out which ones to adopt. Meanwhile, troops are taking their phones into combat. And even without a signal, they can use all sorts of useful apps. Some of these are civilian applications, but others were created by troops, for chores they wanted to automate. And when the troops do get a signal, the phones become even more useful. Even the brass have been impressed.
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of ideas for apps (applications, programs, software). The most widely popular have to do with simply letting troops know where they are, and where the enemy is believed to be. GPS in the smart phone provides the location, the army has plenty of digital maps to use on the smart phones, and local headquarters have reports of where enemy forces are, or are thought to be. Making this stuff available to all troops, all the time, is a big lifesaver, and stress-reliever. There are also apps that enable smart phones to collect fingerprints, and quickly let you know if the guy you have just caught is worth keeping. Another firm has an app that would allow smart phone users to control small UAVs. Another app allows users to share video feeds from nearby UAVs, or from anyone else with a military smart phone. Commanders can quickly draw up a plan for an operation and send it to subordinate commanders (down to team leaders, who run five man infantry teams). This saves time, and on the battlefield, that saves lives. 
Then there are the iPads. These are already being adopted by officers and troops, without waiting for permission. Combat pilots in Afghanistan have, like many businesses, discovered new and useful ways to use the iPad. U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots found the iPad a useful way to carry hundreds of military maps, rather than the hassle of using paper versions. Marine commanders quickly realized this "field expedient" (a military "hack" that adopts something for unofficial use while in the combat zone) worked, and made it official. That meant buying iPads for this and getting to work coming up with more uses. Meanwhile, support troops that have to handle a lot of data, are finding ways to get it done on iPads. This is pretty simple for technical troops who rely on lots of manuals. They are often already available in PDF format, and can easily be put on an iPad. But the iPads are basically hand-held computers, and can do so much more. The troops are making that happen themselves.
All this is nothing new. Last year the U.S. Army decided to establish an app store (the Army Marketplace) for military smart phone users. This includes the iPad, which soldiers are also big fans of. The army app store includes an "App Wanted" section where users can post descriptions of an app they need. If a developer (in uniform, or an army approved civilian with access to the Army Marketplace) is interested, a discussion can be started on an attached message board. The army hopes that the needed app will be quickly created and made available at the Army Marketplace. Developers can charge for their apps, although the army is also willing to pay developers to create needed apps that have been described by military smart phone users.
One of the more impressive apps was one that assisted troops calling in air and artillery fire. Specialized, and now portable, computers have been used in the military for decades, to help troops who call in artillery fire, or air strikes. But these "forward controllers" have to lug around a lot of gear, as they move, often on foot, with the infantry they support. Every bit of weight counts. The less you carry, the more energy you have for life-and-death tasks. Now, there is an app for that, and the forward controllers can leave behind gear that has now been replaced by an iPhone app.
The army and marines see these portable devices as key battlefield tools. Not just for communication, but for a wide range of data handling (computer) chores. Some of these apps turn the iPad or smart phone into part of a weapon. The military wants to work closely with Apple to ensure the troops get the software they need, as well as customized hardware. Details are largely kept secret. But now the military knows, for certain, that creating lots of these apps requires more time and effort than many troops can muster. Then there is the problem of maintenance (upgrading and fixing bugs). So the army is going to establish a team to take care of this, using some army personnel and contractors as part of a permanent organization.
This is all part of a trend. In the last decade, the U.S. military found the iPod music player an increasingly useful tool. This happened for two reasons. As time went on (the iPod was introduced just after September 11, 2001), more and more troops bought iPods. By 2005, most troops had them. The iPod was the perfect entertainment device for the battlefield. When you got a chance to take a break, you put in the ear buds, turned it on, and were in a different place for a few minutes. The iPod battery usually kept going until the next time you got a chance to recharge.
The second reason was that, from the beginning, the iPod could do other things (run software for things other than listening to music). That's because the iPod was, basically, a very small personal computer. In fact, the iPhone is basically an high end iPod (sold as such as the iPod Touch), with cell phone capability added.

The Decline Of The IED

The Decline Of The IED

October 2, 2011: The first decade of the war on terror has killed 6,300 American troops, most of them (71 percent) in Iraq. The most common (47 percent) cause of death overall was roadside bombs and mines. These weapons have been less effective in Afghanistan, where they only caused 39 percent of deaths. All this was in sharp contrast to Vietnam, where 14 percent of American deaths were from bombs and mines.

In Iraq, where the widespread use of bombs and mines began, the U.S. mobilized a multi-billion dollar effort to deal with IEDs (improvised explosive devices, usually roadside bombs), and that effort paid off. New technology (jammers, robots), tactics (predictive analysis and such), equipment (better armor for vehicles and troops) and a lot of determination did the job. Gradually, IEDs became less dangerous. In 2006, it took about five IEDs to cause one coalition casualty (11 percent of them fatal). By 2008 it took nine IEDs per casualty (12 percent fatal). In 2006, only 8 percent of IEDs put out there caused casualties. In 2007, it was nine percent. In 2008, it was less than five percent. At that point, it was clear that the battle with IEDs was being won. The main objective of IEDs was to kill coalition troops, and at that, they were very ineffective. In 2006, you had to use 48 to kill one soldier in Iraq. In 2007, you needed 49 and by 2008, you needed 79. This year there have only been a handful of American deaths from IEDs in Iraq.

Iraqi terrorists are still using roadside bombs, but most of the casualties are Iraqi police, soldiers and civilians. A major reason for the low losses has been MRAP armored trucks, designed to protect its passengers from IEDs, and years of experience in detecting IEDs before they can hurt anyone. New tactics and technologies show up every month. One of the latest items is a data collection system that, thanks to very fast computers, is able to constantly monitor information from thousands of sensors, and predict where IEDs are likely to show up. These warnings show up in the form of red dots on maps displayed in laptops carried in most vehicles. When the engineers or bomb disposal teams check out the dots, and either dispose of the bomb, or confirm that one is not there, the dots disappear.

In Afghanistan, conditions are different. There, IEDs are more frequently used against troops on foot patrol. These, more than attacks on vehicles, tend to cause multiple fatalities. In Afghanistan, the enemy also uses more land mines, both against troops and larger ones against vehicles travelling the numerous dirt roads.

The Taliban, unable to withstand foreign troops in a gun battle, have put most of their resources into an IED campaign. Thus the number of IEDs encountered went from 2,678 in 2007 to than 12,000 last year. This year, the number is declining.

In Afghanistan foreign troops have been on the offensive this year, and more exposed to IED attacks in areas where there has not been time to clear out the IEDs. This is especially true with land mines, which are easier to plant and more difficult to avoid. The mines end up causing more civilian casualties as well, because the Taliban often don't remove the ones that did not go off, or mark the areas where they are. If foreign troops do not encounter mines, and thus have an opportunity to clear them, civilians will eventually encounter them and get hurt.

In Afghanistan, the enemy started off with one big disadvantage, as they didn't have the expertise or the resources of the Iraqi IED specialists. In Iraq, the bombs were built and placed by one of several dozen independent gangs, each containing smaller groups of people with different skills. At the head of each gang was a guy called the money man. That tells you something about how all this works. Nearly all the people involved with IED gangs were Sunni Arabs, and most of them once worked for Saddam and learned how to handle explosives. The gangs hired themselves out to terrorist groups (some of them al Qaeda affiliated), but mainly to Baath Party or Sunni Arab groups that believed the Sunni Arabs should be running the country. You got the money, these gangs got the bombs.

The money man, naturally, called the shots. He hired, individually or as groups, the other specialists. These included scouts (who found the most effective locations to put the bombs), the bomb makers, the emplacers (who placed the bomb) and the trigger team, that actually set the bomb off, and often included an ambush team, to attack the damaged vehicles with AK-47s and RPGs. The trigger team also usually included a guy with a video camera, who recorded the operation. Attacks that failed were also recorded, for later examination to discover what could be improved.

Survivors of the al Qaeda defeat in Iraq fled to Afghanistan, where they brought all these techniques with them. But the Afghans did not have the level of training and experience available in Iraq, so the Afghan IED effort got off to a slow start.

In Iraq, interrogations of captured IED crew members indicated that most IED teams operated on a two week cycle. During this period, the gang prepared and placed from a few, to a dozen IEDs in one, carefully planned operation. Once the money man decided on what area to attack, the scout team (or teams) spent 4-5 days examining the target area, to see how troops, police and traffic operated. They recommend places to put the bombs, and the money man decided how many to build and place where. In Afghanistan, there was less of the two week cycle work, and more planting mines and roadside bombs around areas they wish to protect, especially drug related facilities (where heroin is refined or stored awaiting movement out of the country.)

The bomb makers were contracted to build a certain number of bombs and have them ready for pick up by the emplacers on a certain day. The trigger teams were either already in place, or arrived shortly after the emplacers had successfully planted their bombs. Most of the bombs were discovered and destroyed by the police or troops. Increasingly, the trigger teams were discovered, and attacked, as well. This is where a lot of bomb team members were captured. These men often provided information on other members of the team, which resulted in more arrests.

Thousands of men, involved with these IED gangs, were constantly being captured or killed. There were always plenty of new people willing to have a go at it. The main reason was money. The opportunity to make a month's pay for a few hours, or days, work was worth the risk. But there was a serious shortage of people with technical skills to actually build the bombs. As more of these men were killed or captured, there were fewer bombs, and more of them were duds. This has already been seen in some parts of Afghanistan. There, as the local IED gang is busted up, there follows by several weeks, or months, of no IEDs. But the IEDs are the only effective weapon the Taliban and drug gangs have, so they are spreading millions of dollars around for those willing to get involved.

NATO troops, and particularly the United States, are making a major effort to detect IEDs (improvised explosive devices, or roadside bombs), which have accounted for up to 60 percent of deaths among foreign troops. About several billion dollars' worth of special equipment has arrived in Afghanistan over the last few years, more than doubling the amount of specialized gear used for detecting IEDs, and identifying the personnel making, placing and setting off the bombs. Several thousand specialists arrived to operate the special detection and intelligence programs. The number of IED deaths declined as more anti-IED resources entered the country.