American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

October 21, 2011: Pakistan has bought the American ALQ-211 AIDEWS (Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite) pod for their F-16 fighters. The ALQ-211 allows the aircraft to detect radar, jamming and laser signals hitting the aircraft, as well as the presence of chemical weapons. ALQ-211 also provides some jamming of its own, and assistance on where the signal is coming from, so the pilot can move the aircraft away from the threat. ALQ-211 is also installed in helicopters, but not as a pod. Rather, the individual components are installed in the helicopter where space is available.

The ALQ-211 has been service for a decade, and there have been several upgrades and variants. Foreign customers do not get an ALQ-211 with the same capabilities that American aircraft receive. Components of ALQ-211 are programmable, so that the system can quickly be updated for newly discovered enemy equipment. Pakistan will receive ALQ-211(V)9 (version 9), which costs about $3.5 million per pod.

Saving Sentinel

Saving Sentinel

October 22, 2011: Britain's RAF (Royal Air Force) is faced with major budget cuts over the next five years. One of the systems selected for deactivation, the new Sentinel R1 ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar), is now collecting many fervent RAF and army fans calling for this aircraft to remain in service. That's because of how successful Sentinel has been in Afghanistan. Britain recognizes this, and plans to retire Sentinel only after 2015, when British ground troops are scheduled to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The RAF has been told they could more inexpensively replicate Sentinel functions in a UAV. But with all these cuts, the RAF does not see getting enough money to develop a UAV Sentinel replacement. It cost $1.5 billion to develop Sentinel and build five of them and army commanders believe they would be invaluable in any future operations.
It was only three years ago, after a decade of development, that Sentinel aircraft were sent to Afghanistan. Sentinel is similar to the three decade old U.S. E-8 JSTARS. But instead of mounting the radar and computers in a four engine jet transport (the 707), the British used a 44 ton Canadian Bombadier Global Express twin engine business jet. The highly automated Sentinel has two pilots, and three people in the back running the surveillance equipment. Sentinel operates at about 15,000 meters (45-50,000 feet) and can track vehicles, or even people, on the ground up to 160 kilometers away. Large vehicles (like missile transporters/launchers) can be tracked at twice that range. Sorties in Afghanistan average about nine hours, although the aircraft is capable of staying in the air for 14 hours. The U.S. has been using its E-8 ground radar aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan with great success.

Sentinel uses a U.S. made Raytheon ASARS-2 radar. This is a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system that can focus on a smaller area and provide photo quality images. Sentinel also has a large array of electronic warfare equipment and counter-missile systems. But in Afghanistan it mainly uses its radar, and its satellite and ground communications links to send images to the troops below, who can then run down known or suspected hostiles.

In Afghanistan, Sentinel has also been used for intelligence work (to determine normal traffic patterns in an area, and to alert combat commanders when abnormal traffic shows up), and to track enemy vehicles. The Taliban typically move around in trucks and SUVs, and sometimes on motorcycles. All can be tracked by Sentinel, in any weather. Since Sentinel operates at high altitudes, it is out-of-sight and silent to the Taliban below, who never know when they are being tracked.

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

October 17, 2011: It recently came to light that the U.S. Air Force base where most air force UAV operators are stationed had been infected. This led to speculation about hackers taking control of American UAVs. All air force Predator and Reaper UAVs are operated, via satellite, from this one base in the United States. 

All this was bad reporting. Key loggers are distributed to steal information, not seize control of UAVs. Key loggers secretly record everything typed on the infected PCs keyboard, and send it to the hacker who planted the key logger program. The malware that had gotten into the air base network was a actually credential theft program, not a key logger. Credential theft involves stealing login information (user ID and password), in this case the program was aimed at stealing such information for online games.

The air force initially refused to discuss the situation, and the media was left with what little rumor and gossip there was coming from air force personnel. To halt the speculation that this was some kind of major data breach, the air force eventually provided the details, which showed the combination of rumor, paranoia and poor reporting led to a great, if inaccurate, story.

Normally, the air force likes to keep details of these incidents, so that the people trying to penetrate air force networks (for whatever reason) don't get any useful feedback on how well, or not, there penetration attempt went.

Twilight Vision

Twilight Vision

October 18, 2011: After a decade of effort, the U.S. Army believes it has found the final element for the new fire control system for its AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships. Called Arrowhead, it uses the latest night vision devices (light enhancement and thermal, or heat, based) and fire control electronics to enable AH-64 crews to operate more safely, and effectively, at lower altitudes and in any weather. This is particularly critical in urban areas. As AH-64s were equipped with Arrowhead over the last two years, and sent into action, reports started coming back about one weakness; difficulty using the night sensors in low-light (pre-dawn and dusk) conditions. A solution was quickly found in a 900 gram (two pound) VNsight sensor. This small item combined night vision and visible light to present the pilots with a more accurate view of what's out there in the murk.

Work on Arrowhead got a boost after the Iraq invasion in 2003, which was followed by a growing amount of urban fighting. This created the need for an AH-64 that could hover at 800 meters (2,500 feet) altitude (safe from most small arms fire) and use its high resolution sensors to see who was doing what for out to eight kilometers (five miles) away. Arrowhead could do that, and now all AH-64s have Arrowhead, and many transport helicopters are getting it as well, to make night flying safer.

Over a decade earlier, the army developed another advanced fire control system for their AH-64s, Longbow. But this system was designed for the original mission; flying at higher altitudes, looking for and destroying distant enemy armored vehicles. The Longbow allowed the AH-64 to go after armored vehicles at night and in bad weather. In the past, potential American enemies practiced moving their armor at night and bad weather, to avoid helicopters armed with long range missiles (like Hellfire or TOW). Longbow was doubly lethal because it was designed to avoid giving away its position when using its radar. AH-64s also had electronic countermeasures. Arrowhead, on the other hand, made night and bad weather deadly for enemy troops thinking they could sneak through urban areas unobserved. Longbow could not spot these guys, but Arrowhead could, and did, except in some low light conditions. But with VNsight, that is no longer a problem.

The 7.5 ton AH-64D carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles (plus the 30mm automatic cannon). Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour

Towed Vision

October 12, 2011: The U.S. Army has purchased 56 AN/MPQ-64F1 air surveillance radars. These systems, weighing six tons, are carried in a trailer that is towed by a hummer (which also carries an electricity generator). A crew of two operates the radar, which can be set up in under twenty minutes. Max range, even for small targets like cruise missiles and UAVs, is about 75 kilometers. Older AN/MPQ 64s had a range of 40 kilometers, and these are being upgraded. Max altitude is 20 kilometers (63,000 feet). This is a 3-D, 360 degree radar that revolves once every two seconds. The army already has a hundred of these radars, and plans to use them for another two decades.

Smart Phones At War

Smart Phones At War
October 5, 2011: As quickly as the U.S. Army is moving to develop and adopt a battlefield smart phone, it is actually just trying to keep up with its troops. Civilian firms (both defense oriented and otherwise) have noted this troop interest and quickly come up with solutions to problems the army believes are in the way of deploying a battlefield smart phone. These proposals include solutions for security and lack of a signal. The big problem the army has is not a lack of solutions, but figuring out which ones to adopt. Meanwhile, troops are taking their phones into combat. And even without a signal, they can use all sorts of useful apps. Some of these are civilian applications, but others were created by troops, for chores they wanted to automate. And when the troops do get a signal, the phones become even more useful. Even the brass have been impressed.
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of ideas for apps (applications, programs, software). The most widely popular have to do with simply letting troops know where they are, and where the enemy is believed to be. GPS in the smart phone provides the location, the army has plenty of digital maps to use on the smart phones, and local headquarters have reports of where enemy forces are, or are thought to be. Making this stuff available to all troops, all the time, is a big lifesaver, and stress-reliever. There are also apps that enable smart phones to collect fingerprints, and quickly let you know if the guy you have just caught is worth keeping. Another firm has an app that would allow smart phone users to control small UAVs. Another app allows users to share video feeds from nearby UAVs, or from anyone else with a military smart phone. Commanders can quickly draw up a plan for an operation and send it to subordinate commanders (down to team leaders, who run five man infantry teams). This saves time, and on the battlefield, that saves lives. 
Then there are the iPads. These are already being adopted by officers and troops, without waiting for permission. Combat pilots in Afghanistan have, like many businesses, discovered new and useful ways to use the iPad. U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots found the iPad a useful way to carry hundreds of military maps, rather than the hassle of using paper versions. Marine commanders quickly realized this "field expedient" (a military "hack" that adopts something for unofficial use while in the combat zone) worked, and made it official. That meant buying iPads for this and getting to work coming up with more uses. Meanwhile, support troops that have to handle a lot of data, are finding ways to get it done on iPads. This is pretty simple for technical troops who rely on lots of manuals. They are often already available in PDF format, and can easily be put on an iPad. But the iPads are basically hand-held computers, and can do so much more. The troops are making that happen themselves.
All this is nothing new. Last year the U.S. Army decided to establish an app store (the Army Marketplace) for military smart phone users. This includes the iPad, which soldiers are also big fans of. The army app store includes an "App Wanted" section where users can post descriptions of an app they need. If a developer (in uniform, or an army approved civilian with access to the Army Marketplace) is interested, a discussion can be started on an attached message board. The army hopes that the needed app will be quickly created and made available at the Army Marketplace. Developers can charge for their apps, although the army is also willing to pay developers to create needed apps that have been described by military smart phone users.
One of the more impressive apps was one that assisted troops calling in air and artillery fire. Specialized, and now portable, computers have been used in the military for decades, to help troops who call in artillery fire, or air strikes. But these "forward controllers" have to lug around a lot of gear, as they move, often on foot, with the infantry they support. Every bit of weight counts. The less you carry, the more energy you have for life-and-death tasks. Now, there is an app for that, and the forward controllers can leave behind gear that has now been replaced by an iPhone app.
The army and marines see these portable devices as key battlefield tools. Not just for communication, but for a wide range of data handling (computer) chores. Some of these apps turn the iPad or smart phone into part of a weapon. The military wants to work closely with Apple to ensure the troops get the software they need, as well as customized hardware. Details are largely kept secret. But now the military knows, for certain, that creating lots of these apps requires more time and effort than many troops can muster. Then there is the problem of maintenance (upgrading and fixing bugs). So the army is going to establish a team to take care of this, using some army personnel and contractors as part of a permanent organization.
This is all part of a trend. In the last decade, the U.S. military found the iPod music player an increasingly useful tool. This happened for two reasons. As time went on (the iPod was introduced just after September 11, 2001), more and more troops bought iPods. By 2005, most troops had them. The iPod was the perfect entertainment device for the battlefield. When you got a chance to take a break, you put in the ear buds, turned it on, and were in a different place for a few minutes. The iPod battery usually kept going until the next time you got a chance to recharge.
The second reason was that, from the beginning, the iPod could do other things (run software for things other than listening to music). That's because the iPod was, basically, a very small personal computer. In fact, the iPhone is basically an high end iPod (sold as such as the iPod Touch), with cell phone capability added.

The Decline Of The IED

The Decline Of The IED

October 2, 2011: The first decade of the war on terror has killed 6,300 American troops, most of them (71 percent) in Iraq. The most common (47 percent) cause of death overall was roadside bombs and mines. These weapons have been less effective in Afghanistan, where they only caused 39 percent of deaths. All this was in sharp contrast to Vietnam, where 14 percent of American deaths were from bombs and mines.

In Iraq, where the widespread use of bombs and mines began, the U.S. mobilized a multi-billion dollar effort to deal with IEDs (improvised explosive devices, usually roadside bombs), and that effort paid off. New technology (jammers, robots), tactics (predictive analysis and such), equipment (better armor for vehicles and troops) and a lot of determination did the job. Gradually, IEDs became less dangerous. In 2006, it took about five IEDs to cause one coalition casualty (11 percent of them fatal). By 2008 it took nine IEDs per casualty (12 percent fatal). In 2006, only 8 percent of IEDs put out there caused casualties. In 2007, it was nine percent. In 2008, it was less than five percent. At that point, it was clear that the battle with IEDs was being won. The main objective of IEDs was to kill coalition troops, and at that, they were very ineffective. In 2006, you had to use 48 to kill one soldier in Iraq. In 2007, you needed 49 and by 2008, you needed 79. This year there have only been a handful of American deaths from IEDs in Iraq.

Iraqi terrorists are still using roadside bombs, but most of the casualties are Iraqi police, soldiers and civilians. A major reason for the low losses has been MRAP armored trucks, designed to protect its passengers from IEDs, and years of experience in detecting IEDs before they can hurt anyone. New tactics and technologies show up every month. One of the latest items is a data collection system that, thanks to very fast computers, is able to constantly monitor information from thousands of sensors, and predict where IEDs are likely to show up. These warnings show up in the form of red dots on maps displayed in laptops carried in most vehicles. When the engineers or bomb disposal teams check out the dots, and either dispose of the bomb, or confirm that one is not there, the dots disappear.

In Afghanistan, conditions are different. There, IEDs are more frequently used against troops on foot patrol. These, more than attacks on vehicles, tend to cause multiple fatalities. In Afghanistan, the enemy also uses more land mines, both against troops and larger ones against vehicles travelling the numerous dirt roads.

The Taliban, unable to withstand foreign troops in a gun battle, have put most of their resources into an IED campaign. Thus the number of IEDs encountered went from 2,678 in 2007 to than 12,000 last year. This year, the number is declining.

In Afghanistan foreign troops have been on the offensive this year, and more exposed to IED attacks in areas where there has not been time to clear out the IEDs. This is especially true with land mines, which are easier to plant and more difficult to avoid. The mines end up causing more civilian casualties as well, because the Taliban often don't remove the ones that did not go off, or mark the areas where they are. If foreign troops do not encounter mines, and thus have an opportunity to clear them, civilians will eventually encounter them and get hurt.

In Afghanistan, the enemy started off with one big disadvantage, as they didn't have the expertise or the resources of the Iraqi IED specialists. In Iraq, the bombs were built and placed by one of several dozen independent gangs, each containing smaller groups of people with different skills. At the head of each gang was a guy called the money man. That tells you something about how all this works. Nearly all the people involved with IED gangs were Sunni Arabs, and most of them once worked for Saddam and learned how to handle explosives. The gangs hired themselves out to terrorist groups (some of them al Qaeda affiliated), but mainly to Baath Party or Sunni Arab groups that believed the Sunni Arabs should be running the country. You got the money, these gangs got the bombs.

The money man, naturally, called the shots. He hired, individually or as groups, the other specialists. These included scouts (who found the most effective locations to put the bombs), the bomb makers, the emplacers (who placed the bomb) and the trigger team, that actually set the bomb off, and often included an ambush team, to attack the damaged vehicles with AK-47s and RPGs. The trigger team also usually included a guy with a video camera, who recorded the operation. Attacks that failed were also recorded, for later examination to discover what could be improved.

Survivors of the al Qaeda defeat in Iraq fled to Afghanistan, where they brought all these techniques with them. But the Afghans did not have the level of training and experience available in Iraq, so the Afghan IED effort got off to a slow start.

In Iraq, interrogations of captured IED crew members indicated that most IED teams operated on a two week cycle. During this period, the gang prepared and placed from a few, to a dozen IEDs in one, carefully planned operation. Once the money man decided on what area to attack, the scout team (or teams) spent 4-5 days examining the target area, to see how troops, police and traffic operated. They recommend places to put the bombs, and the money man decided how many to build and place where. In Afghanistan, there was less of the two week cycle work, and more planting mines and roadside bombs around areas they wish to protect, especially drug related facilities (where heroin is refined or stored awaiting movement out of the country.)

The bomb makers were contracted to build a certain number of bombs and have them ready for pick up by the emplacers on a certain day. The trigger teams were either already in place, or arrived shortly after the emplacers had successfully planted their bombs. Most of the bombs were discovered and destroyed by the police or troops. Increasingly, the trigger teams were discovered, and attacked, as well. This is where a lot of bomb team members were captured. These men often provided information on other members of the team, which resulted in more arrests.

Thousands of men, involved with these IED gangs, were constantly being captured or killed. There were always plenty of new people willing to have a go at it. The main reason was money. The opportunity to make a month's pay for a few hours, or days, work was worth the risk. But there was a serious shortage of people with technical skills to actually build the bombs. As more of these men were killed or captured, there were fewer bombs, and more of them were duds. This has already been seen in some parts of Afghanistan. There, as the local IED gang is busted up, there follows by several weeks, or months, of no IEDs. But the IEDs are the only effective weapon the Taliban and drug gangs have, so they are spreading millions of dollars around for those willing to get involved.

NATO troops, and particularly the United States, are making a major effort to detect IEDs (improvised explosive devices, or roadside bombs), which have accounted for up to 60 percent of deaths among foreign troops. About several billion dollars' worth of special equipment has arrived in Afghanistan over the last few years, more than doubling the amount of specialized gear used for detecting IEDs, and identifying the personnel making, placing and setting off the bombs. Several thousand specialists arrived to operate the special detection and intelligence programs. The number of IED deaths declined as more anti-IED resources entered the country.

 

Small Size Supplies Stunning Stealth

Small Size Supplies Stunning Stealth

September 27, 2011: South Korean officials are alarmed after discovering that the navy has only been able to detect 30 percent of the North Korean subs they come across. Moreover, North Korea is using its submarines more frequently in training (for sneaking people into South Korea) exercises. North Korea has a fleet of over 80 mini-subs, plus about 24 older Russian type conventional boats (based on late-World War II German designs, as adapted for Russian service as the Whiskey and Romeo class). China helped North Korea set up its own submarine building operation, which included building some of the large Romeo class subs. North Korea got the idea for minisubs from Russia, which has had them for decades. North Korea has developed several mini-sub designs, most of them available to anyone with the cash to pay. The North Korean minisubs range in size from 76 to 300 tons displacement. Over a dozen of these small subs are equipped to fire torpedoes.

The use of a North Korea midget sub to sink a South Korean corvette in March, 2010, forced the United States, and South Korea, to seriously confront the problems involved in finding these small subs in coastal waters. This was a difficult task, because the target is small, silent (moving using battery power) and in a complex underwater landscape, that makes sonar less effective.

There are some potential solutions. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the U.S. recognized that these coastal operations would become more common. So, in the 1990s, the U.S. developed the Advanced Deployable System (ADS) for detecting non-nuclear submarines in coastal waters. The ADS is portable, and can quickly be flown to where it is needed. ADS is believed to be in South Korea. ADS basically adapts the popular Cold War SOSUS system (many powerful listening devices surrounding the major oceans, and analyzing the noises to locate submarines) developed by the United States.

ADS consists of battery powered passive (they just listen) sensors that are deployed by ship along the sea bottom in coastal waters. A fiber optic cable goes from the sensors (which look like a thick cable) back to shore, where a trailer containing computers and other electronics, and the ADS operators, runs the system. ADS has done well in tests, but it has only recently faced the North Korean mini-subs. There, it was discovered how little capability South Korea warships had to detect the North Korean submarines. Moreover, there is not enough ADS gear to cover all the coastal areas where North Korean subs operate. South Korea is hustling to improve its anti-submarine capabilities. But decades of neglect will take years to recover from.

AMRAAM For Allies

AMRAAM For Allies

September 18, 2011: The U.S. has ordered 437 AMRAAM radar guided air-to-air missiles, to be produced in the next year. Most (234) are the latest version, the AIM-120D. The rest are the older, AIM-120C7, version. Most of these are for foreign customers. Since it entered service two decades ago, over 40 air forces have bought AMRAAM.

AMRAAM entered service in 1992, more than 30 years after the first radar guided air-to-air missile (the AIM-7 Sparrow). AMRAAM was meant to succeed where the AIM-7 didn't. Vietnam, in the 1960s, provided ample evidence that AIM-7 wasn't really ready for prime time. Too many things could go wrong. Several versions later, the AIM-7 got another combat test during the 1991 Gulf War. In combat, 88 AIM 7s were launched, with 28 percent scoring a hit. The AIM 9 Sidewinder did worse, with 97 fired and only 12.6 percent making contact. That said, most of these hits could not have been obtained with cannon, especially when the AIM 7 was used against a target that was trying to get away.

AMRAAM was designed to fix all the reliability and ease-of-use problems that cursed the AIM-7. But AMRAAM has only had a few opportunities to be used in combat, and over half of those launched have hit something. The 120D version entered service four years ago and has longer range and greater accuracy and resistance to countermeasures. So far, AMRAAMs have spent over 1.7 million hours hanging from the wings of jet fighters in flight. Some 2,400 AMRAAMs have been fired, mostly in training or testing operations. That's about a quarter of those produced.

AMRAAM weighs 172 kg (335 pounds), is 3.7 meters (12 feet) long and 178mm (7 inches) in diameter. AMRAAM has a max range of 70 kilometers. These missiles cost about a million dollars each. The missiles are complex mechanical, electronic and chemical systems, and each of them, on average, suffers a component failure every 1,500 hours.

French UAVs Over Libya

French UAVs Over Libya

September 4, 2011: France revealed that it had sent some of its Harfang ("Eagle") UAVs to operate over Libya. The first mission took place on August 24th. The Harfang is a variant of the Israeli Heron TP UAVs. Harfang was meant to serve as a Predator substitute, until a new design can be developed in France. Equipped with a powerful (1,200 horsepower) turbo prop engine, the 4.6 ton Heron TP can operate at 15.5 kilometers (45,000 feet) altitude. That is, above commercial air traffic, and all the air-traffic-control regulations that discourage, and often forbid, UAV use at the same altitude as commercial aircraft. The Heron TP has a one ton payload, enabling it to carry sensors that can give a detailed view of what's on the ground, even from that high up. The endurance of 36 hours makes the Heron TP a competitor for the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, which is the same size as Heron. The big difference between the two is that Reaper is designed to be a combat aircraft, operating at a lower altitude, with less endurance, and able to carry a ton of smart bombs or missiles.

Three Harfangs were purchased two years ago, and sent to Afghanistan last year. Initially, Harfangs in Afghanistan only flew about one sortie a week per aircraft. There were technical problems, and much of the time, only one of the three was available for service. The Harfang usually flies missions of less than 24 hours.

Despite the technical problems with the Harfangs in Afghanistan, France ordered a fourth one. France has tried to buy Predators, but the waiting list is long, and French troops need UAV support now. European aircraft manufacturers have yet to come up with a world class UAV design (like the American Predator and Reaper, or the Israeli Heron, etc.)

Chinese AWACS Mutate and Proliferate

Chinese AWACS Mutate and Proliferate

September 1, 2011: China is apparently using its new KJ-200 AWACS in the navy, as well as with the air force. The KJ-200 entered service in the Chinese Air Force four years ago, and export versions sell for about $145 million each. China has had to develop its own phased array radar for it. In addition to the 54 ton propeller driven Y-8 (which is based on the Russian An-12 and U.S. C-130) AWACS, there are versions using the, 21 ton Y-7, and 157 ton Il-76 jet. But all these AWACS versions are apparently considered less reliable, and more expensive to maintain, than the twin engine, 79 ton, Boeing 737-800. Chinese airlines (some of them controlled by the Chinese Air Force) have been using the 737-800 since 1999 (a year after this model entered service).

Six years ago, the Chinese Air Force realized it was not happy with its first four IL-76 AWACS (A-50s from Russia, converted to use Chinese KJ-2000 radar systems). This led to a smaller system carried in the Chinese made Y-8 aircraft (as the KJ-200). Eventually, as an experiment, the Chinese began outfitting a Boeing 737-800 airliner as an AWACS aircraft. There was apparently never more than one of the 737 AWACS. Even though these work much better than other versions, the U.S. bans the militarization of civil aircraft in Chinese service. Rather than risk more American embargos, the Chinese have held off proceeding with the 737 version.

China has also equipped its 21 ton, twin engine, Y-7 transport with a phased array radar similar to that used on the larger KJ-200 AWACS. The Y-7 is a Chinese copy of the Russian An-24. The Y-7 AWACS would be similar to the U.S. 23 ton E-2 that operates off carriers. The Y-7 was thought to be a version that could operate off China's coming fleet of aircraft carriers. But the Y-7 is also cheaper, and better suited for equipping more air force units with AWACS capability.

The Y-8 turboprop transport based KJ-200 carries a flight crew of five and a mission (AWACS) crew of about a dozen. The aircraft can stay airborne for about seven hours per sortie. The KJ-200 radar has a range of about 300 kilometers, and the computer systems are supposed to be able to handle 5-10 fighters at a time, and keep track of several dozen enemy targets.

 

 

The Robotic Grenade Sees All

The Robotic Grenade Sees All

August 29, 2011: After years of use by police (especially SWAT teams) and some special operations units, the U.S. Army is buying 2,000 small robots designed to be thrown into a dark room or cave, and then move around while transmitting video and sound.

For a long time, the concept of tossing small combat robots into a room, and letting them broadcast back video of what's there, never seemed to work. Partly because the small robots never got small enough to toss, or robust enough to work once they landed. That problem was solved in the last five years with the development of the Recon Scout IR, a small (18.6cm /7.4 inches wide, weighing 540 gr/1.2 pounds) robot. It's basically two wheels with a thick axel containing a battery and electronics. The infrared camera can see about 8 meters (25 feet), while the day cam can see much farther. The night camera turns on automatically when it becomes too dark for the day camera.

The Recon Scout IR can transmit its images 30 (93 feet) meters from inside a building, and three times that outside. It moves at a speed of about 30 cm (one foot) per second, and can survive being dropped about nine meters onto a hard surface. The controller weighs less than 900 gr (two pounds) and has a 88mm (3.5 inch), 640x480 pixel screen. The Recon Scout IR is maneuvered using video game like controls.

To use the Recon Scout IR, you attach two antennae to the device, pull a pin to activate it, and then throw. The controller starts receiving transmissions as soon as the pin is pulled. Battery life depends on how much you move the device around, but it's good for 10-15 minutes of movement, more than enough to check out a large area before sending the troops in.

The Recon Scout IR sold mainly to law enforcement (SWAT teams in particular), but some military Special Operations organizations bought it as well. Recon Scout IR systems cost about $8,000. A more rugged model, the Recon Scout XT is a little larger (20.3 cm/8 inches wide and weighing 590 gr/1.3 pounds) and has claws attached to its two wheels, enabling it to maneuver better in broken terrain. The XT model is designed to be thrown (much like a grenade) up to 40 meters (120 feet) and is more rugged. It is meant to operate in a more violent environment and outdoors. These XT models cost about $15,000 each.

Bomb Jammer As Improvised Explosive Devices Evolve, Soldiers Work to Find New Methods to Detect Them

Bomb Jammers

Bomb Jammer As Improvised Explosive Devices Evolve, Soldiers Work to Find New Methods to Detect Them

GPS Jammers

2011-7-11 14:27:00

Wifi Jammers

FORWARD OPERATING BASE DWYER, AfghanistanU.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, visiting troops in southern Afghanistan, saw how the art of detecting burIED Bomb explosive devices has changed little, in some ways, since his Army days despite the billions of dollars spent by the Pentagon to improve bomb detection.

During a visit to Forward Operating Base Dwyer in Helmand province, Mr. Panetta, 73 years old, witnessed a group of Afghan soldiers training with long, crudely constructed bamboo poles with hooks at one end, scraping through a dirt field to find and destroy improvised explosive devices, or IED Bombs.

The sight reminded Mr. Panetta of when he served as an Army intelligence officer from 1964 to 1966. "When I was in the Army, you used to do that by bayonet," he said.

The IED Bombs planted today by Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan are far more powerful and sophisticated than the mines that troops faced in the 1960s, officials say. Commanders at the base told Mr. Panetta that insurgents use pressure-sensitive plates, wall-mounted explosives and remote-controlled devices to try to kill U.S. and Afghan forces on patrol.

IED Bombs planted by the Taliban are responsible for most U.S. casualties in Afghanistan. Mr. Panetta's predecessor at the Pentagon, Robert Gates, invested heavily in new technologies to try to minimize the threat. The military now uses specially designed armored vehicles to protect troops, sophisticated CTS Jammerss to block radio signals, as well as drone aircraft to spot insurgents planting explosives.

In Iraq, much of the investment fighting IED Bombs went into CTS Jammerss, which blocked radio signals that set off bombs. As a result, most bombs are now set off by pressure plates or command wires. CTS Jammerss are ineffective against those trigger methods, forcing the military to place more emphasis on spotting bombs before they are triggered.

At Dwyer, the Afghan trainees used the bamboo poles to feel at a distance for the telltale signs of an IED Bomb, such as protruding wires.

The bamboo-pole contraption was the brainchild of a U.S. Marine, whom commanders at Dwyer identifIED Bomb as Gunnery Sgt. Holly, who served in Helmand and was subsequently killed in an incident unrelated to his work with IED Bombs.

The 10-to-15-foot bamboo poles, referred to as the "Holly Stick," caught on fast among troops. Since they were put into widespread use in the area, IED Bomb "find rates" have increased by 35%, said Col. David Furness. He attributed the improvement to the methodical pace at which the hooks or sickles are used to scrape the earth.

Handlers feel for possible IED Bombs using the hook. A soft patch in the dirt is a sign the earth had recently been moved, an indicator that an explosive device may be burIED Bomb below.

A Pentagon body tasked with developing IED Bomb defenses is now making a U.S.-manufactured version of the Holly Stick that will be retractable so it can be carrIED Bomb more easily by foot soldiers, the defense secretary was told.

Mr. Panetta sounded impressed. "It's a good idea," he said.

During his two-day visit to Afghanistan, Mr. Panetta met with President Hamid Karzai and other top Afghan officials, as well as top U.S. commanders.

Mr. Panetta said he emerged convinced "we are on the right path" towards the goal of transferring full security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.

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The Secret Weapon In Libya

The Secret Weapon In Libya

August 6, 2011: A key element in providing effective ground support for rebel fighters in Libya has been AWACS air control aircraft. Normally used to track friendly and enemy aircraft over a combat zone, AWACS has also proved useful as a radio relay, to quickly connect fighter-bombers over Libya with NATO headquarters in Italy and rebel headquarters in eastern Libya, to insure that the target being bombed is not a rebel unit.

Back in March, NATO decided to have an AWACS radar aircraft monitoring Libyan airspace 24/7. The AWACS can fly over international waters and still monitor air activity several hundred kilometers into Libya. This was crucial to maintain the no-fly zone established over the Libyan coastal area (where most of the population lives). AWACS can spot Libyan aircraft taking off, and call in fighters to deal with that problem before the Libyan warplanes can get very far. In addition, AWACS monitors friendly aircraft, to prevent collisions, and to help fighters reach tankers faster.

This is not the first time AWACS has proved itself useful in a multitude of ways. For example, two years ago, Turkey allowed NATO to station four AWACS aircraft at an airbase in Turkey. This made it possible to keep an AWACs in the air over Afghanistan 24/7 (or as close to that as possible). Afghanistan has never had a nationwide air-traffic control system. That was largely because there was never enough aircraft flying around to justify it. As the economy keeps growing, and more U.S. and NATO transports and warplanes are out and about, air traffic control has become a growing problem. All those radar blocking hills and high mountains don't help either. So NATO decided to bring in some of their AWACS (which don't get much work since the end of the Cold War) and play aerial traffic cop over Afghanistan. The AWACs can also keep track of any unscheduled air service being used for the drug gangs or the Taliban, or whoever. NATO sent 300 aircrew and ground support to Turkey as well. The AWACS radar can track over a hundred aircraft, within a 400 kilometer radius.
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German Sniper Detectors

German Sniper Detectors

August 3, 2011: German firm Rheinmetall has developed a new vehicle-mounted acoustic sniper detection system. Called ASLS (Acoustic Shooter Locating System), this is continuation of over a decade of effort by Rheinmetall, and other firms, to perfect this kind of technology. American firms, for obvious reasons, have been taking the lead in this effort.

One of the first, and most useful, of these systems was Boomerang. Back in 2004, it was developed in a few months, in response to a U.S. Department of Defense request for an affordable acoustic sniper detector. Testing delayed it from entering immediately. Boomerang was mounted on vehicles, has been around for five years now, and costs about $5,000 each. Boomerang was effective enough to get orders for over 10,000 units, and lots of use from the troops who had it. There were two major upgrades, prolonging the service life of the system.

Acoustic gunfire (sniper) detectors have been in the field for over a decade, and have gotten better each year. Over 60,000 sniper detectors have been shipped to Iraq and Afghanistan, where they have been increasingly useful. Sniper detection systems provide directional information about where the snipers are. Several generations of these systems have showed up over the last decade. The usefulness of these anti-sniper systems has increased as the manufacturers have decreased the number of false alarms, and improved the user interface. There are other reasons for all this progress, including major advances in computing power, sensor quality and software development. One of the latest, and most useful, improvements is providing nearly instant, and easy to comprehend, location info on the sniper.

British, American, French and Israeli manufacturers have produced most of these systems, which are also sold to police organizations. The systems have varied greatly in capabilities, and price. Some of the first ones cost over $200,000, but prices have been dropping rapidly over the last five years, as the technology matured.

An example of the constant new tech is SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems). Earlier this year U.S. Army infantry in Afghanistan have begun receiving SWATS sniper detectors. About 1,500 a month will be delivered through the end of the year. These 183 g (6.4 ounce) devices come in two pieces. One is the sensor, which is worn on the shoulder, while the cell phone size controller, with small LCD display, is worn in front, where it can be quickly glanced at. SWATS calculates (from the sound weapon fired) direction of fire in a tenth of a second. SWATS has been very popular with troops, and cost about $2,000 each. SWATS can also be mounted on vehicles, and still work when the vehicle is moving at speeds of 80 kilometers an hour or more.

As the capability and reliability of these devices has improved, the troops have come to depend on sniper detectors. Last year, 4,500 American troops were shot (most were wounded) by gunfire in Afghanistan. Without sniper detectors, there would be more such casualties. That's because, with a sniper detector, troops can quickly turn on the enemy shooter and deliver accurate fire of their own. American infantry are much more accurate shooters than your average Taliban gunman. That first shot from the Taliban usually misses, which is even more likely when American infantry return fire. SWATS is more accurate and reliable than earlier gunfire detectors, as are most of the new models being introduced.
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