Germany Upgrades Air Defense

Germany Upgrades Air Defense

Germany is upgrading its Cold War era air defense system by purchasing six GM400 air defense radars. These semi-portable (each system can be moved in two 20 foot cargo containers) radars have a range of 400 kilometers, see the aerial situation in 3-D and, on average, operate 24 hours a day, for about five months, before suffering a system failure (which can often be fixed in a few hours, or less). The GM 400s the German Air Force receives will have IFF (Identify, Friend or Foe) equipment installed.

The first reported attempts at conducting Electronic Warfare occurred during the Russo-Japanese War.

The first reported attempts at conducting Electronic Warfare occurred during the Russo-Japanese War. At the Battle of Tsushima, in May 1905, Japanese reconnaissance ships trailed the Russian shipping fleet, transmitting details of the fleet's activities back to the Japanese High Command. The commander of the Russian cruiser Ural requested permission to use his radio transmitters to suppress the Japanese broadcasts, however in a decision he was later to regret, the Russian Vice Admiral denied this request. Thus, the Japanese HQ was kept constantly informed of the Russian ship positions. Some forward thinking Russian commanders later decided on their own initiative to jam these transmissions, however their efforts came too late to prevent the defeat of the Russian fleet who lost 60% of their capital ships on the first day of battle.

Since these early attempts at conducting EW, widespread use of the electromagnetic spectrum for communications and reconnaissance purposes has predominated throughout all stages of subsequent conflicts as well as peacetime activities.

VISIBLE LIGHT

Amounts of visible light can be measured in units of Lux or Foot-candles. Lux is a metric measurement while Foot-Candle is the empirical counterpart.
Lux. The Lux is a unit of illumination or how bright something is. The Lux is defined as the illumination on the surface on a sphere of radius one metre due to a uniform point source of one candle (heated carbon filament) placed at its centre.
Foot-Candle. The Foot-candle is defined as the illumination on the surface on a sphere of radius one-foot due to a uniform point source of one candle placed at its centre.

JSTARS The Keeper

JSTARS The Keeper

December 20, 2011: The U.S. Air Force continues to pay whatever it takes to keep its 17 E-8C Joint STARS (JSTARS) ground surveillance aircraft in service. This costs about a million dollars a month per aircraft just for maintenance and technical support. Fuel and crew costs are additional. In addition, some E-18Cs are getting new engines. The new JT8D engines are modern designs similar to those used on commercial aircraft. The new engines will enable the E-8C to maintain the most effective altitude and burn less fuel doing it. The new engines also require less maintenance.

The air force is spending nearly $100 million on upgrading each of the E-8Cs operated by reservists (the Air National Guard). This includes some new engines, an Internet-like communications capability, long range optical sensors (like that on combat aircraft targeting pods), and the ability to search water surfaces. These aircraft are organized into three units, one of which is in the reserves. In the last decade, JSTARS have flown over 5,200 missions, averaging about 12 hours each.

The E-8 is a militarized Boeing 707 (a 1950s design also used for the KC-135 aerial tanker and other U.S. Air Force electronics warfare aircraft). The main capability is the JSTARS ground search radar. This system has two modes: wide area (showing a 25 by 20 kilometer area) and detailed (4,000 by 5,000 meters). The radar can see out to several hundred kilometers and each screen full of information could be saved and brought back later to compare to another view (to see what has moved). In this manner, operators can track the movement of ground vehicles or ships. Operators can also use the detail mode to pick out specific details of what's going on down there, like tracking the movement of many small missile boats trying to rush an American warship. JSTARS can stay up there for over 12 hours at a time and two or more JSTARS can operate in shifts to provide 24/7 coverage.

The E-8C can be kept in service another 40 years, although will probably be replaced by cheaper, unmanned, aircraft in another decade or so. JSTARS first proved its worth during the 1991 Gulf War, where it accurately, and in real time, tracked the movement of Coalition and Iraqi ground forces. Most recently it was used in Libya and continues to operate over Afghanistan.

Thermals For Almost Everyone

Thermals For Almost Everyone

Canada ordered another $14 million worth of U.S. AN/PAS-13 thermal sights. This device enables infantry to see through darkness, mist and dust storms, because it can make out differences in heat. Over 80,000 of these sights have already been ordered, mostly for U.S. troops. But close allies of the U.S., like Canada, Britain, Australia and the like, have also ordered these rifle and machine-gun accessories. European firms have also developed similar systems.

Troops operating in Iraq and Afghanistan have found these lightweight thermal sights invaluable. Since first appearing in 1998, for use by Special Forces troops, the AN/PAS-13 has gone through several upgrades. The latest version is AN/PAS-13C. It is a little heavier than earlier models, but has longer range and more reliability. Four years ago, a new model appeared that was much more reliable and sturdy, which made thermal sights much more useful, and popular, among combat troops.

The AN/PAS-13C actually comes in three sizes, to accommodate the different ranges of infantry weapons. The smallest one, weighing .8 kg/1.95 pounds, is used on your basic M-16 or M-4 assault rifle. This sight has a range of 680 meters and 3x zoom. It uses 4 AA batteries (lithium, as used in cameras), which gets you about 5.5 hours of use and a resolution of 320x240 pixels. 

The next version weighs 1.3 kg/2.9 pounds, has a range of 1,100 meters and is used in 5.56mm and 7.62mm machine-guns. This sight requires six AA batteries (for 6.5 hours). The heaviest version weighs 1.8 kg/3.7 pounds, has a range of 2,200 meters, and is used by heavy machine-guns and snipers. This one also requires six AA batteries (for 6.5 hours). Both the heavier models have 3x zoom and 640x480 resolution for the user.

Large quantities of the AN/PAS-13 began showing up in Iraq and Afghanistan three years ago, and now everyone wants one. Over 80,000 have been delivered so far. The U.S. Army plans to buy as many as 100,000 AN/PAS-13 sights (at a cost of over $10,000 each)

Disposable Airborne Jammers Arrive

Disposable Airborne Jammers Arrive

December 13, 2011: Right on schedule, the U.S. Air Force is starting production of the jammer version (MALD-J) of its MALD (miniature air-launched decoy) disposable decoy. It was only last year that MALD, after over a decade of development, was delivered in sufficient (although classified) quantities so that aircraft could actually carry out operations with the new device. MALD is a powered decoy that appears, on enemy radar, as a warplane. This MALD works. Six years of wasted effort on earlier designs created several versions that did not. Work then began on MALD-J, a radar jamming version. Currently, only the B-52 and F-16 are equipped to carry MALD.

Meanwhile, the similar U.S. Navy jet powered ADM-141C ITALD (Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy) entered service about the time MALD entered development. ITALD is 2.34 meters (7.7 feet) long with a 1.55 meter (five foot) wingspan. It weighs 180 kg (400 pounds), has a top speed of 460 kilometers an hour and a range of about 300 kilometers. ITALD, as well as the earlier, unpowered, TALD, contains passive and active devices to enhance the radar image the enemy will receive when they spot the decoy. The navy bought about 200 ITALDs. In the late 1980s, the navy bought over 2,000 ADM-141 TALDs, which proved successful during the 1991 Gulf War. Israel also had success in combat with their version of TALD, which was developed from similar decoys designed in the 1970s, based on Israeli and U.S. Navy experience with Russian equipped Arab air defense systems. The U.S. Air Force didn't get interested until after the Cold War ended, and that led to MALD.

The new powered version of MALD is three meters (9.5 feet) long, and its pop-out wings give it a 1.55 meter (five foot) wingspan. The 130 kg (285 pound) decoy is powered by a small turbojet engine that gives it a speed of up to 1000 kilometers an hour, for 45 minutes at 11,000 meters (35,000 feet), or 20 minutes at 1,000 meters (3,100 feet). It can be programmed to fly a specific course to try and get enemy air defenses to open up, so the enemy weapons can be spotted and destroyed. MALDs are also designed to be used in swarms to overwhelm enemy air defenses. The new MALDs cost nearly $300,000 each. The MALD J is more expensive and about five percent heavier.

Early on, the MALD was supposed to be a smaller (by 15 percent), simpler and cheaper ($30,000 each) design. But, as is common with these projects, both the air force and the manufacturer, kept coming up with new things the MALD had to have. Some were necessary others were just part of the usual procurement politics. The current MALD, has a range of nearly 900 kilometers, and is apparently reliable enough to be used in combat. The radar jamming capability of MALD-J will be the first of many electronic warfare capabilities added to the higher (up to half a million dollars, or more, each) priced version of MALD planned for the future. This version is already in development. Thus the air force has pulled ahead in aerial decoy technology, although the TALD/ITALD series have the distinction of having been tested, and successful, in combat.

New £8m blast injury research centre opens at Imperial

New £8m blast injury research centre opens at Imperial

By Neil Bowdler
Health reporter, BBC News

A new £8 million research centre has opened which will study the effects of roadside bombs on British soldiers.

The Royal British Legion Centre for Blast Injury Studies at Imperial College in London will also devise new equipment to protect personnel.

Improvised explosive devices or IEDs are the biggest cause of deaths and injuries to UK troops in Afghanistan.

Scientists at the centre will study the effects on the whole body of blasts "right down to the cellular level."

Blast simulator

Blast injury studies have been conducted at laboratories at Imperial for some time, and the facilities there already include a blast injury simulator.

"Anubis" is both the name for an Egyptian god of the underworld and the Anti-vehicle Underbelly Blast Injury Simulator.

A large blue machine on wheels, the device can replicate the effects on human tissue of a roadside bomb hitting an armoured personnel carrier.

"It simulates an under-vehicle blast by creating a very large movement of a large lump of metal upwards which encroaches on the human body," the centre's director, Professor Anthony Bull told the BBC.

"We can use this to do experiments on human tissues to see how they're damaged and then we can try and mitigate against these injuries."

The centre also hopes to devise new combat boots which can transfer the impact of an IED from the heel to the shin bone, for example, which they believe could result in fewer amputations.

They are using a blue putty-like substance called "shear-thickening fluid" which stiffens to absorb more energy when impacted.

The centre will also be investigating "blast lung", the most common cause of death among soldiers who survive the initial explosion. Symptoms include severe bruising, bleeding and damage to blood vessels in the lung.

The majority of the money for the new centre is coming from the Royal British Legion. The organisation believes technology is already saving lives, but that more can be achieved.

"People are surviving injuries they wouldn't have survived five years ago as a result of all sorts of improvements," said Chris Simpkins, Director General of the Royal British Legion.

"But we don't full understand why, for example, an individual who has had a below-the-knee amputation is experiencing long-term excruciating pain in the other limb.

"The research here will examine the effects on the entire body - not just the visible effects of severe wounds - right down to the cellular level."

Driving In The Dark To Victory

Driving In The Dark To Victory

November 29, 2011: Only two years after introducing DVE (Driver's Vision Enhancers) a camera based night driving aid for combat vehicles, the U.S. Army is upgrading the popular device with an enhanced version of DVE that widens the view from 40 degrees to 107 degrees, provides a better image and is easier to use.

Two years ago, after a decade of development and wide scale testing, the U.S. Army and Marines decided to buy nearly two billion dollars-worth of DVE. This is an infrared (heat sensing) system that consists of a 2.5 kg (5.5 pound) sensor, and a flat panel display that shows what is in front of the vehicle, despite night, fog, smoke or dust. The army has already bought over 80,000 DVEs in the last seven years, so that the equipment could be used on a wide variety of vehicle and in all possible conditions. The new purchases will equip just about every truck and combat vehicles with DVE. The most common users are combat vehicles (M-1 tanks, M-2s, STRYKER, MRAP, and HMMWVs).

There are actually four different versions. DVE Lite is for trucks that cart troops and supplies around. DVE CV is used by combat vehicles. DVE TWV allows the sensor to be moved around, to search a wider area, and is used by wheeled combat vehicles (Stryker and MRAP). There is also a variation of the DVE TWV, used specifically to detect enemy activity, like someone placing roadside bombs or mines.

The driver uses a flat screen display that is moved down in front of the windshield, like a sun visor, so that he can see through night, fog or even a sand storm. The new enhanced DVE allows the driver to quickly expand the view to include the sides of the road or even to glance at the rear pointing IR camera many vehicles have. The enhanced version puts the viewing controls on the steering wheel, thus eliminating the need to fiddle with camera controls. The main camera is mounted at eye level in front of the windshield, between the two front seats of the vehicle.

DVE enables the army to move more quickly, and safely, in all kinds of atmospheric conditions. This not only speeds up supply and movement (of units) operations, but makes combat units more effective. The enemy can no longer rely on bad visibility to slow down U.S. troops. DVE, and especially the enhanced version, has been enthusiastically received by drivers. Previously, they had to use their night vision goggles, where provide a narrow field of view, and are uncomfortable after being worn for hours.

China Builds A Super Heat Seeker

China Builds A Super Heat Seeker

December 2, 2011: A new air-to-air missile (PL-10) has been seen on Chinese J-11B fighters. The PL-10 looks very similar to the South African A-Darter. This is an 89 kg (196 pound), three meter (9.3 foot) long heat seeking missiles that is highly maneuverable and resistant to countermeasures. The A-Darter is not yet in service, but is designed to be similar to the U.S. AIM-9X. A-Darter is being developed in cooperation with Brazil. It's not known if PL-10 is actually in service. It has been described and discussed for at least three years.

The J-11 is a clone of the Russian Su-27. The J-11A is being supplanted by the J-11B. At least two squadrons of J-11Bs are in service with the air force. The original J-11 entered service in 1998, but production was very slow and only a hundred were produced. Chinese officials were dismayed with the performance of the obsolete Russian electronics. After that, at least a hundred of the 33 ton J-11A was built. This model was equipped with modern, Chinese made, electronics and is capable of using up to eight tons of radar guided air-to-air missiles and smart bombs. But the J-11B, while the same size and weight as the J-11A, has a more capable AESA radar and is intended to specialize in air-to-ground missions, while also being able to take care of itself in air-to-air combat. The navy is using a beefed up version of the J-11B (the J-11BH) on its carriers.

There appear to be about 200 J-11s in service, with about 40 percent of them J-11Bs. This is deduced by the number of cell phone photos showing up, from different air force and navy air bases.

An Armload Of X-Ray Vision

An Armload Of X-Ray Vision

December 3, 2011: For the last decade, the U.S. Army has used several generations of portable "see-through-the-wall" sensors. The Eagle series of sensors use low power ultra-wideband radio waves to detect what is behind walls (except metal ones). These devices (there are several versions) weigh less than 2.5 kg (5.5 pounds) and all are hand (or arm) held. The M model can detect motion, of people or animals who are up to six meters behind a 20cm (8 inch) concrete wall. The P model can see into the ground (3-4 meters down) and detect objects, as well as tunnels. The V model produces sharper images, but at shorter ranges. The Eagle 45W is mounted on the arm and is very useful in urban fighting, when the enemy is moving through a building you are outside of.

All these devices use rechargeable batteries that are good for about four hours. The older sensors look like a game controller, and put the image on a small screen, as well as being able to wirelessly transmit the image to a laptop computer, which can use software to enhance the image. These non-radar sensors are popular with police and fire departments, as well as anyone who has to search behind walls, or under roads, for stuff that is broken.

This kind of equipment is nothing new. Five years ago, the troops began using the nine pound Radarvision device. While this tool couldn't see through metal walls, it did give you an image of anyone behind any other wall material, including up to a 30 cm (one foot) of brick, concrete or stone. It could also see through multiple walls. Using a 90 minute battery pack, the image was particularly good if someone in there is moving. Competing devices weighed as little as 3 kg (6.5 pounds), and had a range of up to 20 meters (63 feet) and batteries that lasted 2.5 hours. The latest devices use new technology, are lighter and more reliable and produce sharper images. These can also be worn on the arm, with helmet mounted eye piece providing the visuals.

This equipment does not go out on every mission, but it does often enough to force the enemy to be very creative in trying to hide things (usually without success). The troops like this gear because it is portable and easy to use. The sensors can reveal hidden weapons as well as hidden people in a building or case. These sensors also help avoid civilian casualties, because you can check out who is in a building before going in. Kids are relatively easy to identify, which usually means civilians.

Sharper Night Vision

Sharper Night Vision

November 27, 2011: Two years after U.S. Army troops began receiving the first new helmet mounted ENVGs (Enhanced Night Vision Goggle), another major improvement has shown up; SENVG (Spiral Enhanced Night Vision Goggles). The main improvement with SENVG is a much sharper, true-color image. Troops who tested them did not want to give them up. But fewer than a thousand SENVG are on order so far. Demand is expected to skyrocket once more troops in Afghanistan get these devices.

The ENVGs were so successful that the army ordered 50,000, so that all troops in a combat zone can have them. The ENVG were particularly useful spotting for hidden (in the brush) enemy gunmen at night. Troops equipped with ENVG have a 50 percent probability of spotting these hidden hostiles at 300 meters and an 80 percent probability at 150 meters. This made it much more difficult for enemy fighters to ambush American troops at night. Since the enemy rarely has night vision gear, they have to rely on sound and fleeting glimpses of the approaching Americans. That means the U.S. troops have to be less than 50 meters away before the enemy can open fire. The ENVG thus provides a crucial edge at night. This has been great for American morale, not so good for the Taliban. The SENVG goggles simply increase the American edge.

What made the ENVG so popular was that it combines the older light enhancement technology goggles, with a thermal (heat sensing) night sight. This combined sight weighs about one kilogram (two pounds). The older ENVG (thermal only) weighed 864 gr (1.9 pounds), while the AN/PVS-13 light enhancing device weighed 568 gr (1.25 pounds), for a total of nearly a kilogram (2.15 pounds). The new sight is not only lighter, but more compact and easier to use. It provides a total of 15 hours' use (7.5 hours for thermal imaging and the same for light enhancement). In most cases (where there is some star or moon light) the light enhancement sight will do. But where there is no other light (as in a building or cave) the thermal imager works. The thermal imager also works through fog and sand storms.

It was five years ago that field testing of the original ENVG (the AN/PAS13) took place. This device worked with the current AN/PVS-14 night vision goggles (which provide night vision by enhancing available light), but added the capability to use thermal imaging (seeing differences in heat). As more combat moved to Afghanistan, the ENVG became more critical for battlefield success at night.

Until a decade ago, thermal imaging equipment was large and bulky and only available in vehicles (M-1 tanks and M-2 Bradleys). But in the last five years, smaller and lighter thermal imagers have come on to the market. The U.S. Army Special Forces has been using these lightweight thermal imagers to great effect from the very beginning of their development.

Field testing of the combined device began three years ago, and was quickly found to be popular and reliable. The earlier thermal imager was also very popular, but carrying both night sights was not. At first, the plan was not to equip all combat troops with the more expensive combined sight. That soon changed once user reports came back, praising the ENVG and describing how much of a life-saver it was. Not all non-combat troops will have an ENVG, but every unit will have some. The army found the money ($770 million) to buy over 50,000 of the new ENVGs, which cost about $15,000 each. It takes a while to manufacture these devices, and the army will only have about 10,000 of them by next year.

The SENVGs are equally expensive and difficult to produce. If past experience is any guide, special operations troops (Special Forces and SEALs) will be the first to get them. The new technology in Spiral Enhanced Night Vision Goggles will be included in weapons sights as well.

Taiwan AWACS Enhanced

Taiwan AWACS Enhanced

November 20, 2011: Taiwan is sending another two of its E-2T AWACS aircraft to the U.S. for upgrading to the E-2C 2000 standard. Two Taiwanese E-2Ts were sent last year. The upgrade will cost about $63 million per aircraft.

The E-2T is very similar to the E-2C. Meanwhile, it was only last year that the U.S. Navy received its first E-2D aircraft. This is the latest version of the E-2 Hawkeye radar aircraft that was originally introduced in 1964. The two engine, 24 ton E-2 was never produced in large quantities (fewer than a hundred are in use). Four years ago, the E-2 fleet reached a milestone, of a million flight hours.

The current E-2C models began entering service in the 1970s and are difficult to maintain because of their age. The E-2s always contained a large quantity of the most modern, and failure prone, electronics. Operating mostly off carriers, and thus constantly exposed to corrosive, salty ocean air, the aircraft takes a beating. The five man crew is mostly concerned with using the large radar carried atop the aircraft, and keeping track of friendly, and hostile, aircraft and missiles at up to 400 kilometers distance.

The aircraft can stay in the air for 4-6 hours at a time, and cruises at 450 kilometers an hour. Currently, the three "system operators" use large flat screen displays and many gigabytes of disk storage each (for capturing and comparing data) to operate as a sea-going AWACS. It was the navy that developed the AWACS concept at the end of World War II, using Avenger light bombers, equipped with radar, to control large carrier strikes.

Each American aircraft carrier has four E-2s, and the U.S. Navy has a total fleet of about 70 E-2s. There are several dozen in service in other countries, but only France operates them from carriers. Everyone else uses land based E-2s. About half the E-2s ever built are still flying, and the United States expects to keep using them (as the E-2D) into the 2020s. After that, an unmanned aircraft will probably replace the E-2.

The E-2C 2000 entered service eight years ago, as an interim upgrade before the E-2D (with new engines, new phased array radar, new electronics and many other improvements) arrived. Development and manufacturing of 75 E-2Ds for the U.S. Navy cost about $206 million per aircraft. The E-2D has longer range, and more accurate radar as well as much more efficient and reliable computer systems. Many of the current E-2Cs will get some of the electronics improvements, depending on how much money is available. The first carrier to be equipped with E-2Ds won't happen for another 2-3 years. In the meantime, individual E-2Ds will operate from carriers to work out any remaining bugs and unforeseen problems.

Apache Enters The Block III Era

Apache Enters The Block III Era

November 12, 2011: The U.S. Army has received the first of 51 "low rate initial production" Block III models of the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunship. This is the newest version of the AH-64, and had its first flight three years ago. The U.S. Army will be upgrading all of its 634 AH-64s to the new Block III standard, a process that won't be completed until 2020. The first Block IIIs are entering service now, and will be heavily used to reveal any design or manufacturing flaws. These will be fixed before mass production and conversion begins. 

Block III has a lot of improvements. One of the notable ones is a more powerful and fuel efficient engine, as well as much improved electronics. Block III will also have Internet like capabilities with other aircraft and ground troops. Block III will be able to control several UAVs, and launch missiles at targets spotted by its UAVs. The Block III radar will have longer range and onboard computers will be much more powerful. The electronics will be easier to upgrade and maintain. The combination of improved fire control and Internet capabilities is expected to greatly increase the capabilities of the AH-64.

The 7.5 ton AH-64D carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles (plus the 30mm automatic cannon). Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour.

In addition to the U.S. Army, the Block III is also being bought by the UAE (United Arab Emirates) which is buying 60. Neighboring Saudi Arabia recently ordered 70 of the same model, as well as upgrades for its existing twelve AH-64s, to the Block III standard. Many other of the existing 1,100 AH-64s may be upgraded as well.

 

Slow, Sloppy and Stubborn

November 10, 2011: India's submarine fleet is dying of old age, and new boats are not going to arrive in time. It's not like this was a surprise, but the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy has long been noted as slow, sloppy and stubborn, especially in the face of demands that it speed up. The twisted tale of the tardy submarines is particularly painful.

The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) six of them in service by then. The other six might arrive five years later. It's hard to say, because the manufacturer of the second six has not been selected yet. The defense procurement nabobs speak of "fast track" for this project, but long-time observers of these officials are not expecting speed.

India's effort to build the first six subs (French Scorpenes), under license, has been delayed several times, and the price has gone up to $5 billion ($834 million each). While this effort will leave India with thousands of workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines, all that will be wasted because the defense procurement bureaucrats seem to have learned nothing. These officials already caused numerous delays, and cost overruns, during negotiations to build the Scorpene diesel-electric submarines. The bureaucrats mismanaged this deal to the extent that it is nearly three years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule if you count the several years the Indian bureaucrats delayed it even getting started. The delays and mismanagement have so far increased the cost of the $4 billion project by 25 percent. The first Scorpene is supposed to enter service in 2015 years, with one a year after that until all six are delivered.

There's some urgency to all this, because by next year, five of India's 16 subs (10 Kilo and two Foxtrot class Russian built boats and four German Type 209s) will be retired (some are already semi-retired because of age and infirmity). Two years after that, India will only have five working subs. India believes it needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and China.

But the bureaucrats and politicians dithered for nearly a decade, and it wasn't until 2005 that India signed a deal to buy six French Scorpene class boats. The delays led to the French increasing prices on some key components, and India has had some problems in getting production going on their end. The first Scorpene was to be built in France, with the other five built in India. While some problems were expected (India has been doing license manufacturing of complex weapons for decades), the defense ministry procurement bureaucrats never ceased to amaze when it came to delaying work, or just getting in the way.

The Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French) that Pakistan recently bought. The first of the Agostas was built in France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a more recent design, the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a 36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes and/or anti-ship missiles carried.) The Scorpene is a little heavier (1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32) and is a little faster. It has six 533mm torpedo tubes, and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system. This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). The Pakistanis have an option to retrofit AIP in their current two Agostas.

While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as the primary adversary. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the Pakistani boats, both because of less advanced technology, and less well trained crews. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will be nearly a decade before all six of the Scorpenes are in service. At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about 20 percent of them nuclear.

Building The Battlefield Tablet

Building The Battlefield Tablet

November 14, 2011: The U.S. Army is developing a tablet computer for battlefield use. Because the iPad is too large to be used on the battlefield, a smaller (18cm/7 inch versus 26cm/10.1 inch) Android model is the favorite. The current plan is to add several layers of security (require fingerprint or face/voice recognition) to the existing password requirement. Battlefield tablets and cell phones also need hardware and/or software to handle the additional wireless security required. This is not a big problem, but developing and testing a system that works well enough to be useful in combat takes time.

Another problem is that troops are often wearing gloves on the battlefield. But in many cases fingerless gloves get the job done, and allow touch sensitive tablets to be used. Field tests have already found that the devices (tablets and cell phones) are quite rugged, especially if covered by the inexpensive (under $10) protective "skins" you can buy anywhere. The troops are big users of tablets, and often create job-specific software for them.

Laser Is Cheaper Than Lead

Laser Is Cheaper Than Lead

November 1, 2011: Over the last decade, the U.S. has developed revolutionary training technology and techniques for combat shooting. First it was the use of electronic rifle ranges, and now it has expanded to outdoor versions, where troops use laser equipped rifles to shoot at 3-D popup, stationary targets or even moving vehicles and personnel. These portable Targetry Systems can easily be set up anywhere, in open or urban areas. Using laser weapons (identical to those developed in the 1980s for combat training), there is no danger to the troops or anyone else in the area.

In addition to providing a lot more weapons training, these electronic systems save a lot of money. The U.S. Marine Corps has saved over half a billion dollars in the last five years, by using indoor electronic firing ranges. IMST (Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer) has cost over $200 million, but the savings in ammo, wear on weapons, and running outdoor ranges were much larger. Nearly 200,000 marines have undergone marksmanship training using IMST. Unlike the similar U.S. Army EST system, IMST is wireless. A special ammo magazine contains gas that provides realistic recoil and a wireless radio device connects the weapon to the targets displayed on the screen and records how accurately the electronic rounds were fired. Wireless systems like this also make the targetry systems possible, because an important aspect of all this is keeping track of every "shot" fired, and where it landed. This provides valuable feedback for the trainees, on what works, and what doesn't.

Devices like IMST and EST have boosted the shooting skills of troops, while reducing costs. This gives American riflemen a big battlefield advantage. In most armies, the troops rarely fire their rifles. Ammo is too expensive (given the meager military budget). When there is combat, the troops are issued bullets, which they fire very inaccurately. Against a better trained foe, this leads to quick defeat. Happens all the time. But now cash strapped armies can train their troops to be effective marksmen without spending a lot of money, by using simulators.

The U.S. Army pioneered this with their EST (Engagement Skills Trainer) 2000 system. Each of these consists of a movie theater size screen (but at ground level, not raised) with back projection target situations displayed as interactive movies. The troops use rifles, pistols and machine-guns that are actual weapons, but modified to fire "electronic bullets", and, via a thin cable, use a pneumatic system that provides recoil as well. There is a sound system to depict the sound of the weapons firing, as well as a computer controlled tracking of ammo fired, letting users know when they have to reload.

Because EST and IMST are simulators, they capture a precise record of exactly where the shooter's weapon is aimed, how well the shooter pulls the trigger, and how long it takes to find and fire at the next target. This enables instructors to much more rapidly detect problems troops are having, and correct them. Tests have shown that you can take people with no weapons experience, put them through four hours of simulator training, and take them to a rifle range, and they will be able to fire accurately enough to exceed military requirements. Studies have shown that troops trained with a simulator gain as much marksmanship skill as those using live ammo.

In addition, a simulator like this can be used for training troops in ways that are impractical using live ammo. For example, when used for "shoot/don't shoot" situations, the appropriate visuals (either an enemy soldier or a civilian) are shown on the video screen. Soldiers train in a group, positioned as they would be in a real situation. The scenario then plays out, allowing the troops to practice when they should shoot, and when they should not. Training can be for day or night scenarios, and for a wide variety of situations.

These systems are sometimes built into standard shipping containers, so they can be moved around to where they are needed. The more useful of these "sims in a box" are the "encounter" and "convoy" sims. The encounter sim puts troops in a container containing video screens on three sides that portray an encounter between troops and foreign civilians (as they would encounter on patrol or manning a checkpoint). The troops are then allowed to deal with typical problems encountered in situations like this. While not combat (although some gunfire can be introduced), it is extremely useful training for troops headed for the combat zone.

A nation like China can build EST like systems for less than $100,000. But the Chinese have traditionally spent more time training their infantry to move quietly and pay attention to camouflage. These are important combat skills, which most nations do not spend a lot of time on. But when it comes time to shoot someone, you have an edge if your troops are accurate. China has been building aircraft and vehicle simulators. Operating warplanes and tanks is very expensive, and simulators are a much cheaper way to give operators useful experience.

In the West, there has been a lot more development of non-combat simulators in the last few decades. This has pushed total worldwide simulator sales to over $8 billion a year (out of total defense sales of $1,100 billion). Operators of electronic equipment are much more effective if they have lots of experience. But actually using their radars, sonars or complex missile systems is also very expensive. So simulators provide essential experience inexpensively.

Most nations can appreciate the need to train their pilots, ship crews and electronics operators to be better at their jobs. But ground combat troops are another matter. In most nations, the army exists mainly to protect the leadership from the population. The troops tend to get frequent training for riot control. Issuing them a lot of ammo is not considered wise, as soldiers in these countries are not considered particularly reliable. So even in military affairs, political expediency trumps everything else.

Chinese Remote Weapons Stations

Chinese Remote Weapons Stations

November 2, 2011: A Chinese firm is marketing a RWS (Remote Weapon Stations). This one is similar to the light (74 kg/163 pounds) model used by the U.S. Army. The Chinese RWS is apparently not meant for vehicle use, but for facility or perimeter security. The Chinese RWS is shown mounting a light (5.8mm) machine-gun and touted for "counter-terror" missions. China is playing catch-up in this area, as Western nations have been developing RWS for decades. The Chinese have developed a vehicle mounted RWS, but is described as still in development. This RWS is armed with a 12.7mm machine-gun and two anti-aircraft missiles. While the missiles are unusual for an RWS, the control systems look familiar to Western RWS operators. The same video game features are used. China also has millions of young men with lots of video game experience.

The U.S. Army continues to improve its RWS systems. These devices allow an operator inside the vehicle to control the gun and its sensors. Among the improvements are the addition of a green laser, which can temporarily blind people, and has long been used to stop drivers who keep coming at checkpoints despite other signals to stop. Used in an RWS, it would enable the RWS operator to flash suspicious people with the blinding light, rather than opening up with the weapon. Another upgrade is the addition of cameras to the side and rear of the turret, so that the operator can quickly check for activity all around without moving the turret (which sometimes alerts an enemy that they have been spotted.) Another addition is an IR Pointer, which, at night, enables the RWS operator to put a light, visible only to those using night-vision equipment, on something suspicious, or otherwise important. The larger CROWS II RWS has also been equipped and tested with a Javelin missile launcher. The army sees RWS as a key element in the development of remotely controlled, or autonomous, armored vehicles. The Chinese RWS does not have any of these features. But some, like the green laser, could easily be added.

RWS was one of the most important (in terms of saving lives) new weapons to appear in the last decade. This now ubiquitous remote control weapon (usually a machine-gun) is seen on many vehicles (from hummers to MRAPs and tanks). The U.S. Army has bought, or plans to buy, a total of 18,000 RWS systems. The army currently has 7,600 RWS in service. An RWS turret costs, on average, about $212,000 each. The remote control gun turret has now become a standard system on American combat vehicles.

Norwegian firm Kongsberg, the major supplier, has several models of its Protec RWS, to support small, medium and large sized weapons. Now there are a lot of competitors, if only because Kongsberg can't keep up with the demand. Many of the new competitors are trying to grab niche markets. The more obvious ones are those demanding RWS that can handle larger weapons, like 25mm or 30mm autocannon. But the most interesting new development is the portable RWS. It can be mounted on a hummer, but quickly removed, and carried by two troops, and set up anywhere using a tripod. The operator can stay behind cover, while the light machine-gun, exposed to hostile fire, unflinchingly takes on the enemy. There are lots of combat situations that could make use of this lightweight RWS.

The Protec RWS is the key component of the U.S. Army CROWS (common remotely operated weapon stations). This idea of a remote control turret has been around for nearly half a century, but years of tinkering, and better technology, have made the remote control gun turret finally work effectively, dependably and affordably. This has made the RWS practical for widespread combat use. While some troops miss the greater feeling of situational awareness (especially being able to hear and smell the surroundings) you got as an old-school turret gunner, most soldiers and marines have adapted and accepted the new system. What it lacks in the smelling and hearing department, it makes up in terms of night vision and zoom. And it's a lot safer.

CROWS is a real life saver, not to mention anxiety reducer, for troops who drive through bandit country a lot, and man the turret gun. You're a target up there, and too often, the bad guys get you. Not with CROWS. The gunner is inside the vehicle, checking out the surroundings (with night vision, zoom and telephoto capabilities). CROWS also has a laser rangefinder built in, as well as a stabilizer mechanism to allow more accurate fire while the vehicle is moving. The CROWS systems (RWS, weapon and installation) cost about $260,000 each, and can mount a variety of weapons (M2 12.7mm/.50 caliber machine-gun, MK19 40-mm automatic grenade launcher, M240B 7.62mm machine-gun and M249 5.56mm squad automatic weapon). CROWS comes in several different configurations, based on weapon mounted and armor installed (light, at 74 kg/163 pounds, standard, at 136 kg/298 pounds and CROWS II, at 172 kg/379 pounds.) The heaviest version is usually used in MRAP (armored trucks) and has a better user interface, a thermal imager and sniper detection system.

The Chinese system offered for sale is more similar to Israeli use of RWS, in turrets guarding the long border with Gaza. The Chinese RWS might be pitched to the many Chinese firms setting up mines and industrial facilities in Africa and parts of Asia that are prone to criminal gangs that carry out large scale raids. Multiple RWS systems would be a deterrent to such attacks.

By the end of 2006, there were about a thousand CROWS in U.S. service. There are now nearly 8,000. Many of the enemy fighters have seen Western or Japanese films featuring killer robots, and often think that's what they are facing. The fear factor is real, and it helps. The accuracy of the fire, and uncanny speed with which the CROWS gun moves to point at a target, is due to something few officers expected; so many troops who quickly become expert RWS operators. The guys operating these systems grew up playing video games. They developed skills in operating computer systems (video games) very similar to the CROWS controls. This was important, because viewing the world around the vehicle via a vidcam is not as enlightening (although a lot safer) than having your head and chest exposed to the elements (and any firepower the enemy sends your way). But experienced video gamers are skilled at whipping that screen view around, and picking up any signs of danger.

Since many troops have years of experience with video games, they take to CROWS quickly, and very effectively. This has further frightened hostile gunmen, who are quick to attribute magical qualities to American equipment. However, many CROWS users have mixed feelings about the system, because they know that you have more awareness of your surroundings if you are actually standing with your head and shoulders outside the vehicle, manning a machine-gun. For this reason, RWS manufacturers are investigating adding more sensors (for things like sound, smell and wind direction.) But the biggest improvements have been more reliability, ease-of-use, more sensors and lower cost.

The Rise Of the Illusion

The Rise Of the Illusion

October 25, 2011: The mass media is having a good time with the idea that several hundred Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk herald an unprecedented age of robot surveillance and destruction. Actually, it's a practice that has been present for thousands of years, and one that, like everything else in the last century, is taking advantage of new technology.

It's all about information. Warfare grew out of hunting, and hunting was all about information. Namely, where the prey was and where it was headed. To this day, hunters who have learned to read the signs (detect spoor, the term for the signs any critter leaves behind) and follow it, are more likely to bring home the fresh meat. As hunting evolved into warfare, the ability to track gave your side an edge. This evolved into espionage, but it was all about correctly noting and interpreting signs that were, well, just there. Be they footprints, bent grass, marks on trees or rocks, or gossip in a market place, those who could collect and sort out the spoor, had an edge.

The military first saw aircraft as a better way to collect information. Combat (shooting at other aircraft and bombing ground targets) came later. What UAVs do is allow you to keep aircraft over an area of interest more cheaply. But just because these aircraft are unmanned does not mean they are robots. They are controlled from the ground. In the past, the pilot and observer were on board, which required a larger and more expensive aircraft, which could not stay in that air as long as an unmanned one. What made the modern UAV possible is cheaper, smaller and more reliable cameras, computers and communications gear.

Commanders have always wanted more aerial reconnaissance, and until UAVs came along, it was too expensive to put as many recon aircraft up there as were needed for "persistent" (continuous) surveillance. Now that they have it, those ignorant of history see something sinister. That's nothing new, but that's another story.

What you will see evolving out of the current UAVs is more software to handle the tedious job of constantly scanning the ground for something useful. This software has been around for over a decade, and is slowly being incorporated into analyzing all sorts of digital video feeds. In factories, it looks for unsafe work habits. In stores, it looks for shoplifters, and shopping patterns. In hospitals, it monitors patients, especially unconscious ones, for signs of trouble, or improvement. In police work, the software can scan through thousands of hours of video for clues and suspects. On the battlefield, scanning software looks for signs of the enemy, and what they are up to.

But people still create the software, and interpret the results. People still fly the robotic aircraft, with the help of the same kind of automatic pilot software long used in manned aircraft. Thus it's not an ominous development we are witnessing, just history in action. Trends happen more quickly these days, and not just for consumer electronics.

American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

American Pods Protect Pakistani Pilots

October 21, 2011: Pakistan has bought the American ALQ-211 AIDEWS (Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite) pod for their F-16 fighters. The ALQ-211 allows the aircraft to detect radar, jamming and laser signals hitting the aircraft, as well as the presence of chemical weapons. ALQ-211 also provides some jamming of its own, and assistance on where the signal is coming from, so the pilot can move the aircraft away from the threat. ALQ-211 is also installed in helicopters, but not as a pod. Rather, the individual components are installed in the helicopter where space is available.

The ALQ-211 has been service for a decade, and there have been several upgrades and variants. Foreign customers do not get an ALQ-211 with the same capabilities that American aircraft receive. Components of ALQ-211 are programmable, so that the system can quickly be updated for newly discovered enemy equipment. Pakistan will receive ALQ-211(V)9 (version 9), which costs about $3.5 million per pod.

Saving Sentinel

Saving Sentinel

October 22, 2011: Britain's RAF (Royal Air Force) is faced with major budget cuts over the next five years. One of the systems selected for deactivation, the new Sentinel R1 ASTOR (Airborne Stand-Off Radar), is now collecting many fervent RAF and army fans calling for this aircraft to remain in service. That's because of how successful Sentinel has been in Afghanistan. Britain recognizes this, and plans to retire Sentinel only after 2015, when British ground troops are scheduled to be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The RAF has been told they could more inexpensively replicate Sentinel functions in a UAV. But with all these cuts, the RAF does not see getting enough money to develop a UAV Sentinel replacement. It cost $1.5 billion to develop Sentinel and build five of them and army commanders believe they would be invaluable in any future operations.
It was only three years ago, after a decade of development, that Sentinel aircraft were sent to Afghanistan. Sentinel is similar to the three decade old U.S. E-8 JSTARS. But instead of mounting the radar and computers in a four engine jet transport (the 707), the British used a 44 ton Canadian Bombadier Global Express twin engine business jet. The highly automated Sentinel has two pilots, and three people in the back running the surveillance equipment. Sentinel operates at about 15,000 meters (45-50,000 feet) and can track vehicles, or even people, on the ground up to 160 kilometers away. Large vehicles (like missile transporters/launchers) can be tracked at twice that range. Sorties in Afghanistan average about nine hours, although the aircraft is capable of staying in the air for 14 hours. The U.S. has been using its E-8 ground radar aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan with great success.

Sentinel uses a U.S. made Raytheon ASARS-2 radar. This is a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system that can focus on a smaller area and provide photo quality images. Sentinel also has a large array of electronic warfare equipment and counter-missile systems. But in Afghanistan it mainly uses its radar, and its satellite and ground communications links to send images to the troops below, who can then run down known or suspected hostiles.

In Afghanistan, Sentinel has also been used for intelligence work (to determine normal traffic patterns in an area, and to alert combat commanders when abnormal traffic shows up), and to track enemy vehicles. The Taliban typically move around in trucks and SUVs, and sometimes on motorcycles. All can be tracked by Sentinel, in any weather. Since Sentinel operates at high altitudes, it is out-of-sight and silent to the Taliban below, who never know when they are being tracked.

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

All Your UAVs Are Belong To Us

October 17, 2011: It recently came to light that the U.S. Air Force base where most air force UAV operators are stationed had been infected. This led to speculation about hackers taking control of American UAVs. All air force Predator and Reaper UAVs are operated, via satellite, from this one base in the United States. 

All this was bad reporting. Key loggers are distributed to steal information, not seize control of UAVs. Key loggers secretly record everything typed on the infected PCs keyboard, and send it to the hacker who planted the key logger program. The malware that had gotten into the air base network was a actually credential theft program, not a key logger. Credential theft involves stealing login information (user ID and password), in this case the program was aimed at stealing such information for online games.

The air force initially refused to discuss the situation, and the media was left with what little rumor and gossip there was coming from air force personnel. To halt the speculation that this was some kind of major data breach, the air force eventually provided the details, which showed the combination of rumor, paranoia and poor reporting led to a great, if inaccurate, story.

Normally, the air force likes to keep details of these incidents, so that the people trying to penetrate air force networks (for whatever reason) don't get any useful feedback on how well, or not, there penetration attempt went.

Twilight Vision

Twilight Vision

October 18, 2011: After a decade of effort, the U.S. Army believes it has found the final element for the new fire control system for its AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships. Called Arrowhead, it uses the latest night vision devices (light enhancement and thermal, or heat, based) and fire control electronics to enable AH-64 crews to operate more safely, and effectively, at lower altitudes and in any weather. This is particularly critical in urban areas. As AH-64s were equipped with Arrowhead over the last two years, and sent into action, reports started coming back about one weakness; difficulty using the night sensors in low-light (pre-dawn and dusk) conditions. A solution was quickly found in a 900 gram (two pound) VNsight sensor. This small item combined night vision and visible light to present the pilots with a more accurate view of what's out there in the murk.

Work on Arrowhead got a boost after the Iraq invasion in 2003, which was followed by a growing amount of urban fighting. This created the need for an AH-64 that could hover at 800 meters (2,500 feet) altitude (safe from most small arms fire) and use its high resolution sensors to see who was doing what for out to eight kilometers (five miles) away. Arrowhead could do that, and now all AH-64s have Arrowhead, and many transport helicopters are getting it as well, to make night flying safer.

Over a decade earlier, the army developed another advanced fire control system for their AH-64s, Longbow. But this system was designed for the original mission; flying at higher altitudes, looking for and destroying distant enemy armored vehicles. The Longbow allowed the AH-64 to go after armored vehicles at night and in bad weather. In the past, potential American enemies practiced moving their armor at night and bad weather, to avoid helicopters armed with long range missiles (like Hellfire or TOW). Longbow was doubly lethal because it was designed to avoid giving away its position when using its radar. AH-64s also had electronic countermeasures. Arrowhead, on the other hand, made night and bad weather deadly for enemy troops thinking they could sneak through urban areas unobserved. Longbow could not spot these guys, but Arrowhead could, and did, except in some low light conditions. But with VNsight, that is no longer a problem.

The 7.5 ton AH-64D carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles (plus the 30mm automatic cannon). Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour

Towed Vision

October 12, 2011: The U.S. Army has purchased 56 AN/MPQ-64F1 air surveillance radars. These systems, weighing six tons, are carried in a trailer that is towed by a hummer (which also carries an electricity generator). A crew of two operates the radar, which can be set up in under twenty minutes. Max range, even for small targets like cruise missiles and UAVs, is about 75 kilometers. Older AN/MPQ 64s had a range of 40 kilometers, and these are being upgraded. Max altitude is 20 kilometers (63,000 feet). This is a 3-D, 360 degree radar that revolves once every two seconds. The army already has a hundred of these radars, and plans to use them for another two decades.

Smart Phones At War

Smart Phones At War
October 5, 2011: As quickly as the U.S. Army is moving to develop and adopt a battlefield smart phone, it is actually just trying to keep up with its troops. Civilian firms (both defense oriented and otherwise) have noted this troop interest and quickly come up with solutions to problems the army believes are in the way of deploying a battlefield smart phone. These proposals include solutions for security and lack of a signal. The big problem the army has is not a lack of solutions, but figuring out which ones to adopt. Meanwhile, troops are taking their phones into combat. And even without a signal, they can use all sorts of useful apps. Some of these are civilian applications, but others were created by troops, for chores they wanted to automate. And when the troops do get a signal, the phones become even more useful. Even the brass have been impressed.
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of ideas for apps (applications, programs, software). The most widely popular have to do with simply letting troops know where they are, and where the enemy is believed to be. GPS in the smart phone provides the location, the army has plenty of digital maps to use on the smart phones, and local headquarters have reports of where enemy forces are, or are thought to be. Making this stuff available to all troops, all the time, is a big lifesaver, and stress-reliever. There are also apps that enable smart phones to collect fingerprints, and quickly let you know if the guy you have just caught is worth keeping. Another firm has an app that would allow smart phone users to control small UAVs. Another app allows users to share video feeds from nearby UAVs, or from anyone else with a military smart phone. Commanders can quickly draw up a plan for an operation and send it to subordinate commanders (down to team leaders, who run five man infantry teams). This saves time, and on the battlefield, that saves lives. 
Then there are the iPads. These are already being adopted by officers and troops, without waiting for permission. Combat pilots in Afghanistan have, like many businesses, discovered new and useful ways to use the iPad. U.S. Marine Corps helicopter pilots found the iPad a useful way to carry hundreds of military maps, rather than the hassle of using paper versions. Marine commanders quickly realized this "field expedient" (a military "hack" that adopts something for unofficial use while in the combat zone) worked, and made it official. That meant buying iPads for this and getting to work coming up with more uses. Meanwhile, support troops that have to handle a lot of data, are finding ways to get it done on iPads. This is pretty simple for technical troops who rely on lots of manuals. They are often already available in PDF format, and can easily be put on an iPad. But the iPads are basically hand-held computers, and can do so much more. The troops are making that happen themselves.
All this is nothing new. Last year the U.S. Army decided to establish an app store (the Army Marketplace) for military smart phone users. This includes the iPad, which soldiers are also big fans of. The army app store includes an "App Wanted" section where users can post descriptions of an app they need. If a developer (in uniform, or an army approved civilian with access to the Army Marketplace) is interested, a discussion can be started on an attached message board. The army hopes that the needed app will be quickly created and made available at the Army Marketplace. Developers can charge for their apps, although the army is also willing to pay developers to create needed apps that have been described by military smart phone users.
One of the more impressive apps was one that assisted troops calling in air and artillery fire. Specialized, and now portable, computers have been used in the military for decades, to help troops who call in artillery fire, or air strikes. But these "forward controllers" have to lug around a lot of gear, as they move, often on foot, with the infantry they support. Every bit of weight counts. The less you carry, the more energy you have for life-and-death tasks. Now, there is an app for that, and the forward controllers can leave behind gear that has now been replaced by an iPhone app.
The army and marines see these portable devices as key battlefield tools. Not just for communication, but for a wide range of data handling (computer) chores. Some of these apps turn the iPad or smart phone into part of a weapon. The military wants to work closely with Apple to ensure the troops get the software they need, as well as customized hardware. Details are largely kept secret. But now the military knows, for certain, that creating lots of these apps requires more time and effort than many troops can muster. Then there is the problem of maintenance (upgrading and fixing bugs). So the army is going to establish a team to take care of this, using some army personnel and contractors as part of a permanent organization.
This is all part of a trend. In the last decade, the U.S. military found the iPod music player an increasingly useful tool. This happened for two reasons. As time went on (the iPod was introduced just after September 11, 2001), more and more troops bought iPods. By 2005, most troops had them. The iPod was the perfect entertainment device for the battlefield. When you got a chance to take a break, you put in the ear buds, turned it on, and were in a different place for a few minutes. The iPod battery usually kept going until the next time you got a chance to recharge.
The second reason was that, from the beginning, the iPod could do other things (run software for things other than listening to music). That's because the iPod was, basically, a very small personal computer. In fact, the iPhone is basically an high end iPod (sold as such as the iPod Touch), with cell phone capability added.

The Decline Of The IED

The Decline Of The IED

October 2, 2011: The first decade of the war on terror has killed 6,300 American troops, most of them (71 percent) in Iraq. The most common (47 percent) cause of death overall was roadside bombs and mines. These weapons have been less effective in Afghanistan, where they only caused 39 percent of deaths. All this was in sharp contrast to Vietnam, where 14 percent of American deaths were from bombs and mines.

In Iraq, where the widespread use of bombs and mines began, the U.S. mobilized a multi-billion dollar effort to deal with IEDs (improvised explosive devices, usually roadside bombs), and that effort paid off. New technology (jammers, robots), tactics (predictive analysis and such), equipment (better armor for vehicles and troops) and a lot of determination did the job. Gradually, IEDs became less dangerous. In 2006, it took about five IEDs to cause one coalition casualty (11 percent of them fatal). By 2008 it took nine IEDs per casualty (12 percent fatal). In 2006, only 8 percent of IEDs put out there caused casualties. In 2007, it was nine percent. In 2008, it was less than five percent. At that point, it was clear that the battle with IEDs was being won. The main objective of IEDs was to kill coalition troops, and at that, they were very ineffective. In 2006, you had to use 48 to kill one soldier in Iraq. In 2007, you needed 49 and by 2008, you needed 79. This year there have only been a handful of American deaths from IEDs in Iraq.

Iraqi terrorists are still using roadside bombs, but most of the casualties are Iraqi police, soldiers and civilians. A major reason for the low losses has been MRAP armored trucks, designed to protect its passengers from IEDs, and years of experience in detecting IEDs before they can hurt anyone. New tactics and technologies show up every month. One of the latest items is a data collection system that, thanks to very fast computers, is able to constantly monitor information from thousands of sensors, and predict where IEDs are likely to show up. These warnings show up in the form of red dots on maps displayed in laptops carried in most vehicles. When the engineers or bomb disposal teams check out the dots, and either dispose of the bomb, or confirm that one is not there, the dots disappear.

In Afghanistan, conditions are different. There, IEDs are more frequently used against troops on foot patrol. These, more than attacks on vehicles, tend to cause multiple fatalities. In Afghanistan, the enemy also uses more land mines, both against troops and larger ones against vehicles travelling the numerous dirt roads.

The Taliban, unable to withstand foreign troops in a gun battle, have put most of their resources into an IED campaign. Thus the number of IEDs encountered went from 2,678 in 2007 to than 12,000 last year. This year, the number is declining.

In Afghanistan foreign troops have been on the offensive this year, and more exposed to IED attacks in areas where there has not been time to clear out the IEDs. This is especially true with land mines, which are easier to plant and more difficult to avoid. The mines end up causing more civilian casualties as well, because the Taliban often don't remove the ones that did not go off, or mark the areas where they are. If foreign troops do not encounter mines, and thus have an opportunity to clear them, civilians will eventually encounter them and get hurt.

In Afghanistan, the enemy started off with one big disadvantage, as they didn't have the expertise or the resources of the Iraqi IED specialists. In Iraq, the bombs were built and placed by one of several dozen independent gangs, each containing smaller groups of people with different skills. At the head of each gang was a guy called the money man. That tells you something about how all this works. Nearly all the people involved with IED gangs were Sunni Arabs, and most of them once worked for Saddam and learned how to handle explosives. The gangs hired themselves out to terrorist groups (some of them al Qaeda affiliated), but mainly to Baath Party or Sunni Arab groups that believed the Sunni Arabs should be running the country. You got the money, these gangs got the bombs.

The money man, naturally, called the shots. He hired, individually or as groups, the other specialists. These included scouts (who found the most effective locations to put the bombs), the bomb makers, the emplacers (who placed the bomb) and the trigger team, that actually set the bomb off, and often included an ambush team, to attack the damaged vehicles with AK-47s and RPGs. The trigger team also usually included a guy with a video camera, who recorded the operation. Attacks that failed were also recorded, for later examination to discover what could be improved.

Survivors of the al Qaeda defeat in Iraq fled to Afghanistan, where they brought all these techniques with them. But the Afghans did not have the level of training and experience available in Iraq, so the Afghan IED effort got off to a slow start.

In Iraq, interrogations of captured IED crew members indicated that most IED teams operated on a two week cycle. During this period, the gang prepared and placed from a few, to a dozen IEDs in one, carefully planned operation. Once the money man decided on what area to attack, the scout team (or teams) spent 4-5 days examining the target area, to see how troops, police and traffic operated. They recommend places to put the bombs, and the money man decided how many to build and place where. In Afghanistan, there was less of the two week cycle work, and more planting mines and roadside bombs around areas they wish to protect, especially drug related facilities (where heroin is refined or stored awaiting movement out of the country.)

The bomb makers were contracted to build a certain number of bombs and have them ready for pick up by the emplacers on a certain day. The trigger teams were either already in place, or arrived shortly after the emplacers had successfully planted their bombs. Most of the bombs were discovered and destroyed by the police or troops. Increasingly, the trigger teams were discovered, and attacked, as well. This is where a lot of bomb team members were captured. These men often provided information on other members of the team, which resulted in more arrests.

Thousands of men, involved with these IED gangs, were constantly being captured or killed. There were always plenty of new people willing to have a go at it. The main reason was money. The opportunity to make a month's pay for a few hours, or days, work was worth the risk. But there was a serious shortage of people with technical skills to actually build the bombs. As more of these men were killed or captured, there were fewer bombs, and more of them were duds. This has already been seen in some parts of Afghanistan. There, as the local IED gang is busted up, there follows by several weeks, or months, of no IEDs. But the IEDs are the only effective weapon the Taliban and drug gangs have, so they are spreading millions of dollars around for those willing to get involved.

NATO troops, and particularly the United States, are making a major effort to detect IEDs (improvised explosive devices, or roadside bombs), which have accounted for up to 60 percent of deaths among foreign troops. About several billion dollars' worth of special equipment has arrived in Afghanistan over the last few years, more than doubling the amount of specialized gear used for detecting IEDs, and identifying the personnel making, placing and setting off the bombs. Several thousand specialists arrived to operate the special detection and intelligence programs. The number of IED deaths declined as more anti-IED resources entered the country.

 

Small Size Supplies Stunning Stealth

Small Size Supplies Stunning Stealth

September 27, 2011: South Korean officials are alarmed after discovering that the navy has only been able to detect 30 percent of the North Korean subs they come across. Moreover, North Korea is using its submarines more frequently in training (for sneaking people into South Korea) exercises. North Korea has a fleet of over 80 mini-subs, plus about 24 older Russian type conventional boats (based on late-World War II German designs, as adapted for Russian service as the Whiskey and Romeo class). China helped North Korea set up its own submarine building operation, which included building some of the large Romeo class subs. North Korea got the idea for minisubs from Russia, which has had them for decades. North Korea has developed several mini-sub designs, most of them available to anyone with the cash to pay. The North Korean minisubs range in size from 76 to 300 tons displacement. Over a dozen of these small subs are equipped to fire torpedoes.

The use of a North Korea midget sub to sink a South Korean corvette in March, 2010, forced the United States, and South Korea, to seriously confront the problems involved in finding these small subs in coastal waters. This was a difficult task, because the target is small, silent (moving using battery power) and in a complex underwater landscape, that makes sonar less effective.

There are some potential solutions. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the U.S. recognized that these coastal operations would become more common. So, in the 1990s, the U.S. developed the Advanced Deployable System (ADS) for detecting non-nuclear submarines in coastal waters. The ADS is portable, and can quickly be flown to where it is needed. ADS is believed to be in South Korea. ADS basically adapts the popular Cold War SOSUS system (many powerful listening devices surrounding the major oceans, and analyzing the noises to locate submarines) developed by the United States.

ADS consists of battery powered passive (they just listen) sensors that are deployed by ship along the sea bottom in coastal waters. A fiber optic cable goes from the sensors (which look like a thick cable) back to shore, where a trailer containing computers and other electronics, and the ADS operators, runs the system. ADS has done well in tests, but it has only recently faced the North Korean mini-subs. There, it was discovered how little capability South Korea warships had to detect the North Korean submarines. Moreover, there is not enough ADS gear to cover all the coastal areas where North Korean subs operate. South Korea is hustling to improve its anti-submarine capabilities. But decades of neglect will take years to recover from.

AMRAAM For Allies

AMRAAM For Allies

September 18, 2011: The U.S. has ordered 437 AMRAAM radar guided air-to-air missiles, to be produced in the next year. Most (234) are the latest version, the AIM-120D. The rest are the older, AIM-120C7, version. Most of these are for foreign customers. Since it entered service two decades ago, over 40 air forces have bought AMRAAM.

AMRAAM entered service in 1992, more than 30 years after the first radar guided air-to-air missile (the AIM-7 Sparrow). AMRAAM was meant to succeed where the AIM-7 didn't. Vietnam, in the 1960s, provided ample evidence that AIM-7 wasn't really ready for prime time. Too many things could go wrong. Several versions later, the AIM-7 got another combat test during the 1991 Gulf War. In combat, 88 AIM 7s were launched, with 28 percent scoring a hit. The AIM 9 Sidewinder did worse, with 97 fired and only 12.6 percent making contact. That said, most of these hits could not have been obtained with cannon, especially when the AIM 7 was used against a target that was trying to get away.

AMRAAM was designed to fix all the reliability and ease-of-use problems that cursed the AIM-7. But AMRAAM has only had a few opportunities to be used in combat, and over half of those launched have hit something. The 120D version entered service four years ago and has longer range and greater accuracy and resistance to countermeasures. So far, AMRAAMs have spent over 1.7 million hours hanging from the wings of jet fighters in flight. Some 2,400 AMRAAMs have been fired, mostly in training or testing operations. That's about a quarter of those produced.

AMRAAM weighs 172 kg (335 pounds), is 3.7 meters (12 feet) long and 178mm (7 inches) in diameter. AMRAAM has a max range of 70 kilometers. These missiles cost about a million dollars each. The missiles are complex mechanical, electronic and chemical systems, and each of them, on average, suffers a component failure every 1,500 hours.

French UAVs Over Libya

French UAVs Over Libya

September 4, 2011: France revealed that it had sent some of its Harfang ("Eagle") UAVs to operate over Libya. The first mission took place on August 24th. The Harfang is a variant of the Israeli Heron TP UAVs. Harfang was meant to serve as a Predator substitute, until a new design can be developed in France. Equipped with a powerful (1,200 horsepower) turbo prop engine, the 4.6 ton Heron TP can operate at 15.5 kilometers (45,000 feet) altitude. That is, above commercial air traffic, and all the air-traffic-control regulations that discourage, and often forbid, UAV use at the same altitude as commercial aircraft. The Heron TP has a one ton payload, enabling it to carry sensors that can give a detailed view of what's on the ground, even from that high up. The endurance of 36 hours makes the Heron TP a competitor for the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper, which is the same size as Heron. The big difference between the two is that Reaper is designed to be a combat aircraft, operating at a lower altitude, with less endurance, and able to carry a ton of smart bombs or missiles.

Three Harfangs were purchased two years ago, and sent to Afghanistan last year. Initially, Harfangs in Afghanistan only flew about one sortie a week per aircraft. There were technical problems, and much of the time, only one of the three was available for service. The Harfang usually flies missions of less than 24 hours.

Despite the technical problems with the Harfangs in Afghanistan, France ordered a fourth one. France has tried to buy Predators, but the waiting list is long, and French troops need UAV support now. European aircraft manufacturers have yet to come up with a world class UAV design (like the American Predator and Reaper, or the Israeli Heron, etc.)

Chinese AWACS Mutate and Proliferate

Chinese AWACS Mutate and Proliferate

September 1, 2011: China is apparently using its new KJ-200 AWACS in the navy, as well as with the air force. The KJ-200 entered service in the Chinese Air Force four years ago, and export versions sell for about $145 million each. China has had to develop its own phased array radar for it. In addition to the 54 ton propeller driven Y-8 (which is based on the Russian An-12 and U.S. C-130) AWACS, there are versions using the, 21 ton Y-7, and 157 ton Il-76 jet. But all these AWACS versions are apparently considered less reliable, and more expensive to maintain, than the twin engine, 79 ton, Boeing 737-800. Chinese airlines (some of them controlled by the Chinese Air Force) have been using the 737-800 since 1999 (a year after this model entered service).

Six years ago, the Chinese Air Force realized it was not happy with its first four IL-76 AWACS (A-50s from Russia, converted to use Chinese KJ-2000 radar systems). This led to a smaller system carried in the Chinese made Y-8 aircraft (as the KJ-200). Eventually, as an experiment, the Chinese began outfitting a Boeing 737-800 airliner as an AWACS aircraft. There was apparently never more than one of the 737 AWACS. Even though these work much better than other versions, the U.S. bans the militarization of civil aircraft in Chinese service. Rather than risk more American embargos, the Chinese have held off proceeding with the 737 version.

China has also equipped its 21 ton, twin engine, Y-7 transport with a phased array radar similar to that used on the larger KJ-200 AWACS. The Y-7 is a Chinese copy of the Russian An-24. The Y-7 AWACS would be similar to the U.S. 23 ton E-2 that operates off carriers. The Y-7 was thought to be a version that could operate off China's coming fleet of aircraft carriers. But the Y-7 is also cheaper, and better suited for equipping more air force units with AWACS capability.

The Y-8 turboprop transport based KJ-200 carries a flight crew of five and a mission (AWACS) crew of about a dozen. The aircraft can stay airborne for about seven hours per sortie. The KJ-200 radar has a range of about 300 kilometers, and the computer systems are supposed to be able to handle 5-10 fighters at a time, and keep track of several dozen enemy targets.

 

 

The Robotic Grenade Sees All

The Robotic Grenade Sees All

August 29, 2011: After years of use by police (especially SWAT teams) and some special operations units, the U.S. Army is buying 2,000 small robots designed to be thrown into a dark room or cave, and then move around while transmitting video and sound.

For a long time, the concept of tossing small combat robots into a room, and letting them broadcast back video of what's there, never seemed to work. Partly because the small robots never got small enough to toss, or robust enough to work once they landed. That problem was solved in the last five years with the development of the Recon Scout IR, a small (18.6cm /7.4 inches wide, weighing 540 gr/1.2 pounds) robot. It's basically two wheels with a thick axel containing a battery and electronics. The infrared camera can see about 8 meters (25 feet), while the day cam can see much farther. The night camera turns on automatically when it becomes too dark for the day camera.

The Recon Scout IR can transmit its images 30 (93 feet) meters from inside a building, and three times that outside. It moves at a speed of about 30 cm (one foot) per second, and can survive being dropped about nine meters onto a hard surface. The controller weighs less than 900 gr (two pounds) and has a 88mm (3.5 inch), 640x480 pixel screen. The Recon Scout IR is maneuvered using video game like controls.

To use the Recon Scout IR, you attach two antennae to the device, pull a pin to activate it, and then throw. The controller starts receiving transmissions as soon as the pin is pulled. Battery life depends on how much you move the device around, but it's good for 10-15 minutes of movement, more than enough to check out a large area before sending the troops in.

The Recon Scout IR sold mainly to law enforcement (SWAT teams in particular), but some military Special Operations organizations bought it as well. Recon Scout IR systems cost about $8,000. A more rugged model, the Recon Scout XT is a little larger (20.3 cm/8 inches wide and weighing 590 gr/1.3 pounds) and has claws attached to its two wheels, enabling it to maneuver better in broken terrain. The XT model is designed to be thrown (much like a grenade) up to 40 meters (120 feet) and is more rugged. It is meant to operate in a more violent environment and outdoors. These XT models cost about $15,000 each.

Bomb Jammer As Improvised Explosive Devices Evolve, Soldiers Work to Find New Methods to Detect Them

Bomb Jammers

Bomb Jammer As Improvised Explosive Devices Evolve, Soldiers Work to Find New Methods to Detect Them

GPS Jammers

2011-7-11 14:27:00

Wifi Jammers

FORWARD OPERATING BASE DWYER, AfghanistanU.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, visiting troops in southern Afghanistan, saw how the art of detecting burIED Bomb explosive devices has changed little, in some ways, since his Army days despite the billions of dollars spent by the Pentagon to improve bomb detection.

During a visit to Forward Operating Base Dwyer in Helmand province, Mr. Panetta, 73 years old, witnessed a group of Afghan soldiers training with long, crudely constructed bamboo poles with hooks at one end, scraping through a dirt field to find and destroy improvised explosive devices, or IED Bombs.

The sight reminded Mr. Panetta of when he served as an Army intelligence officer from 1964 to 1966. "When I was in the Army, you used to do that by bayonet," he said.

The IED Bombs planted today by Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan are far more powerful and sophisticated than the mines that troops faced in the 1960s, officials say. Commanders at the base told Mr. Panetta that insurgents use pressure-sensitive plates, wall-mounted explosives and remote-controlled devices to try to kill U.S. and Afghan forces on patrol.

IED Bombs planted by the Taliban are responsible for most U.S. casualties in Afghanistan. Mr. Panetta's predecessor at the Pentagon, Robert Gates, invested heavily in new technologies to try to minimize the threat. The military now uses specially designed armored vehicles to protect troops, sophisticated CTS Jammerss to block radio signals, as well as drone aircraft to spot insurgents planting explosives.

In Iraq, much of the investment fighting IED Bombs went into CTS Jammerss, which blocked radio signals that set off bombs. As a result, most bombs are now set off by pressure plates or command wires. CTS Jammerss are ineffective against those trigger methods, forcing the military to place more emphasis on spotting bombs before they are triggered.

At Dwyer, the Afghan trainees used the bamboo poles to feel at a distance for the telltale signs of an IED Bomb, such as protruding wires.

The bamboo-pole contraption was the brainchild of a U.S. Marine, whom commanders at Dwyer identifIED Bomb as Gunnery Sgt. Holly, who served in Helmand and was subsequently killed in an incident unrelated to his work with IED Bombs.

The 10-to-15-foot bamboo poles, referred to as the "Holly Stick," caught on fast among troops. Since they were put into widespread use in the area, IED Bomb "find rates" have increased by 35%, said Col. David Furness. He attributed the improvement to the methodical pace at which the hooks or sickles are used to scrape the earth.

Handlers feel for possible IED Bombs using the hook. A soft patch in the dirt is a sign the earth had recently been moved, an indicator that an explosive device may be burIED Bomb below.

A Pentagon body tasked with developing IED Bomb defenses is now making a U.S.-manufactured version of the Holly Stick that will be retractable so it can be carrIED Bomb more easily by foot soldiers, the defense secretary was told.

Mr. Panetta sounded impressed. "It's a good idea," he said.

During his two-day visit to Afghanistan, Mr. Panetta met with President Hamid Karzai and other top Afghan officials, as well as top U.S. commanders.

Mr. Panetta said he emerged convinced "we are on the right path" towards the goal of transferring full security responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.

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The Secret Weapon In Libya

The Secret Weapon In Libya

August 6, 2011: A key element in providing effective ground support for rebel fighters in Libya has been AWACS air control aircraft. Normally used to track friendly and enemy aircraft over a combat zone, AWACS has also proved useful as a radio relay, to quickly connect fighter-bombers over Libya with NATO headquarters in Italy and rebel headquarters in eastern Libya, to insure that the target being bombed is not a rebel unit.

Back in March, NATO decided to have an AWACS radar aircraft monitoring Libyan airspace 24/7. The AWACS can fly over international waters and still monitor air activity several hundred kilometers into Libya. This was crucial to maintain the no-fly zone established over the Libyan coastal area (where most of the population lives). AWACS can spot Libyan aircraft taking off, and call in fighters to deal with that problem before the Libyan warplanes can get very far. In addition, AWACS monitors friendly aircraft, to prevent collisions, and to help fighters reach tankers faster.

This is not the first time AWACS has proved itself useful in a multitude of ways. For example, two years ago, Turkey allowed NATO to station four AWACS aircraft at an airbase in Turkey. This made it possible to keep an AWACs in the air over Afghanistan 24/7 (or as close to that as possible). Afghanistan has never had a nationwide air-traffic control system. That was largely because there was never enough aircraft flying around to justify it. As the economy keeps growing, and more U.S. and NATO transports and warplanes are out and about, air traffic control has become a growing problem. All those radar blocking hills and high mountains don't help either. So NATO decided to bring in some of their AWACS (which don't get much work since the end of the Cold War) and play aerial traffic cop over Afghanistan. The AWACs can also keep track of any unscheduled air service being used for the drug gangs or the Taliban, or whoever. NATO sent 300 aircrew and ground support to Turkey as well. The AWACS radar can track over a hundred aircraft, within a 400 kilometer radius.
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German Sniper Detectors

German Sniper Detectors

August 3, 2011: German firm Rheinmetall has developed a new vehicle-mounted acoustic sniper detection system. Called ASLS (Acoustic Shooter Locating System), this is continuation of over a decade of effort by Rheinmetall, and other firms, to perfect this kind of technology. American firms, for obvious reasons, have been taking the lead in this effort.

One of the first, and most useful, of these systems was Boomerang. Back in 2004, it was developed in a few months, in response to a U.S. Department of Defense request for an affordable acoustic sniper detector. Testing delayed it from entering immediately. Boomerang was mounted on vehicles, has been around for five years now, and costs about $5,000 each. Boomerang was effective enough to get orders for over 10,000 units, and lots of use from the troops who had it. There were two major upgrades, prolonging the service life of the system.

Acoustic gunfire (sniper) detectors have been in the field for over a decade, and have gotten better each year. Over 60,000 sniper detectors have been shipped to Iraq and Afghanistan, where they have been increasingly useful. Sniper detection systems provide directional information about where the snipers are. Several generations of these systems have showed up over the last decade. The usefulness of these anti-sniper systems has increased as the manufacturers have decreased the number of false alarms, and improved the user interface. There are other reasons for all this progress, including major advances in computing power, sensor quality and software development. One of the latest, and most useful, improvements is providing nearly instant, and easy to comprehend, location info on the sniper.

British, American, French and Israeli manufacturers have produced most of these systems, which are also sold to police organizations. The systems have varied greatly in capabilities, and price. Some of the first ones cost over $200,000, but prices have been dropping rapidly over the last five years, as the technology matured.

An example of the constant new tech is SWATS (Soldier Worn Acoustic Targeting Systems). Earlier this year U.S. Army infantry in Afghanistan have begun receiving SWATS sniper detectors. About 1,500 a month will be delivered through the end of the year. These 183 g (6.4 ounce) devices come in two pieces. One is the sensor, which is worn on the shoulder, while the cell phone size controller, with small LCD display, is worn in front, where it can be quickly glanced at. SWATS calculates (from the sound weapon fired) direction of fire in a tenth of a second. SWATS has been very popular with troops, and cost about $2,000 each. SWATS can also be mounted on vehicles, and still work when the vehicle is moving at speeds of 80 kilometers an hour or more.

As the capability and reliability of these devices has improved, the troops have come to depend on sniper detectors. Last year, 4,500 American troops were shot (most were wounded) by gunfire in Afghanistan. Without sniper detectors, there would be more such casualties. That's because, with a sniper detector, troops can quickly turn on the enemy shooter and deliver accurate fire of their own. American infantry are much more accurate shooters than your average Taliban gunman. That first shot from the Taliban usually misses, which is even more likely when American infantry return fire. SWATS is more accurate and reliable than earlier gunfire detectors, as are most of the new models being introduced.
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Chinese UAVs Go To Sea

Chinese UAVs Go To Sea

July 14, 2011: Chinese warships were recently seen, for the first time, operating UAVs at sea (over a thousand kilometers south of Okinawa). Japanese P-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft spotted a fixed wing UAV taking off, using rockets, from a destroyer , and landing in the water, being recovered via a net. This UAV appeared to be a navalized version of the most numerous model used by the Chinese army; the ASN-206. This is a 222 kg (488 pound) aircraft, with a 50 kg (110 pound) payload. It has a max endurance of eight hours, but more common is an endurance of four hours. Max range from the control equipment is 150 kilometers and cruising speed is about 180 kilometers an hour. This UAV uses a catapult to launch itself from the helicopter deck of a destroyer or frigate.  The UAV lands via parachute, so the aircraft get banged up a lot.

The U.S. Navy has been doing this for two decades, but is switching to helicopter UAVs, and is currently using the MQ-8B (formerly the RQ-8) Fire Scout. The first to carry this helicopter UAV was a Perry class frigate, the USS McInerney (FFG-8) two years ago. Assigned to the 4th Fleet, and this ship operates in the Caribbean, chasing drug smugglers. Prior to this assignment, the Fire Scout underwent 110 takeoffs and landings on the frigate, and 600 hours of flight testing.

The MQ-8B can stay in the air for up to eight hours at a time (five hour missions are more common), has a top speed of 230 kilometers an hour, and can operate up to 230 kilometers from its controller (on land, or a ship.) The MQ-8B is also being used on the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Chinese firms have also developed helicopter UAVs, but none have been seen on warships yet.
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Real Time Armor Analysis

Real Time Armor Analysis

June 30, 2011: Having added more and more sensors to armored (and unarmored ) vehicles, to monitor electrical and mechanical systems, the U.S. Army is now going to do the same to the armor itself. Sensors to monitor engines and other systems have been in aircraft and ships for decades, and are now common in cars and trucks. The new armor sensors report on bullet or shell hits in real time, and also track damage. This sort of thing is useful because it's noisy in combat, and difficult to keep track on what part of the vehicle (like an armored hummer, MRAP or M-2 IFV) is getting hit by bullets. The new sensors will also report what type of fire (caliber, machine-gun or single shot) as well as where. This makes it much easier to decide where to take the vehicle, and where to return fire. And, it also keeps track of how "healthy" the vehicle armor is.

All this is part of an ongoing trend. For example, the U.S. Air Force is retrofitting sensor-type tech on older aircraft. With that done, you can plug the older aircraft into existing aircraft test systems. The older systems would just tell you if a component is working, or not. But the newer systems uses software, and a large database of information on how the aircraft works, or doesn't, to quickly resolve complex maintenance problems. Often, maintainers can spend hundreds of hours trying to figure out exactly what is wrong with an aircraft. The problem is that many OK, but slightly off, components can combine to create a failure. Such problems are very difficult to diagnose. This test system not only finds the problems much more quickly, but usually can provide step-by-step instructions on how to repair it. In the past, maintainers often replaced perfectly good, but suspect, parts in vain attempts to get $50 million aircraft flight ready.

Most recent aircraft, like recent automobiles, come with similar test systems. The automobile industry has been using similar systems for over a decade, but has not created such systems for older automobiles, because the older cars don't have the sensors and microprocessors built in for this sort of thing. But in the aviation industry, it pays to build computerized diagnostic systems for older aircraft if the current maintenance costs are high enough.

Now, new combat vehicles are not only getting access to the power diagnostic systems, but armor that is also monitored, and analyzed with all the other vehicle systems.
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It's Worse Than You Can Understand

It's Worse Than You Can Understand

June 19, 2011: The U.S. Department of Defense is trying to improve its network defenses, and those of companies that supply weapons and equipment. The new plan is to pool intelligence, and defensive techniques with the major defense companies. This is being done as a pilot project called DIB (Defense Industrial Base) Cyber Pilot. This is a long shot, as the organizations with the best Internet security are not inclined to share. That's because the most dangerous vulnerability is someone knowing how your defenses are organized, and what kind of intelligence you are collecting (and how you do it) on the hackers. When it comes to security, the net is a very paranoid place.

Firms with the most to lose, like financial institutions, guard their data most successfully. They do this the old-fashioned way, with layers and layers of security, implemented by the best (and most highly paid) people and pushed by senior managers who take the time to learn about what they are dealing with, and what it will take to stay on top of the problem.

It's different in the defense business. If the Chinese steal data on some new weapon, there might be a problem years down the road, when the Chinese offer a cheaper alternative to an American weapon, for the export market. But even that problem has a silver lining, in that you can get away with insisting that those clever Chinese developed your technology independently. Meanwhile, everyone insists that there was no espionage, cyber or traditional, involved. As a further benefit, the American firm will get more money from a terrified government, in order to maintain the American technical edge. It's the same general drill for military organizations. But for financial institutions, especially those that trade in fast moving currency, derivatives and bond markets, any information leaks can have immediate, and calamitous consequences. You must either protect your data, or die.

Because of the shortage of high-end Internet security people (it's complex stuff, and a lot of the best people are lured away to the dark side), there is not enough talent to go around. Then there's that disinclination to share. Sharing with the government or defense contractors is seen as a particular waste, as these organizations lack sufficient short term incentives to stay alert and reliable.

Meanwhile, Chinese Internet based espionage has been going on for years. Some of the attacks have been traced back to Chinese government computers. But how do you respond? It's possible that there has already been a response. Espionage is a two way street, and the United States certainly has the resources (in terms of talented Internet engineers and hackers) to do the same kind of snooping against Chinese computers. If so, like the Chinese, there would be no admission of such activities. That's how espionage is done, in the dark, with denials all around. Meanwhile, China has been making more desperate sounding exhortations for their own civilian firms to get stronger Internet defenses. But China has an even greater shortage of Internet security specialists, and is much more vulnerable than the government will allow anyone to admit (or go into detail about).

But the biggest problem, according to military Cyber War commanders, is the difficulty in making it clear to political leaders, and non-expert (in Internet matters) military commanders, what the cyber weapons are, and the ramifications of the attacks. Some types of attacks are accompanied by the risk of shutting down much, or all, of the Internet. Other types of operations can be traced back to the source. This could trigger a more conventional, even nuclear, response. Some attacks use worms (programs that, once unleashed, keep spreading by themselves.) You can program worms to shut down after a certain time (or when certain conditions are met). But these weapons are difficult, often impossible, to test "in the wild" (on the Internet). By comparison, nuclear weapons were a new, very high-tech, weapon in 1945. But nukes were easy to understand; it was a very powerful bomb. Cyber weapons are much less predictable, and that will make them more difficult for senior officials to order unleashed.

So the first order of business is to develop reliable techniques to quickly, and accurately, educate the senior decision makers about what they are about to unleash. This would begin with the simplest, and cheapest, weapons, which are botnets, used for DDOS attacks. In plain English, that means gaining (by purchase or otherwise) access to hundreds, or thousands, of home and business PCs that have had special software secretly installed. This allows whoever installed the software that turned these PCs into zombies, to do whatever they want with these machines. The most common thing done is to have those PCs, when hooked up to the Internet, to send as many emails, or other electronic messages, as it can, to a specified website. When this is done with lots of zombies (a botnet), the flood of messages becomes a DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack that shuts the target down. This happens because so much junk is coming in from the botnet, that no one else can use the web site.

But there are even more dangerous cyberwar weapons out there. You can unleash worm and virus software modified to take advantage of largely unknown Internet vulnerabilities, that allow the user access to many business, government and military computers. This sort of thing is called, "using high value exploits" (flaws in code that are not yet widely known). These exploits are a lot more expensive, and require more skill to use. Currently, a major source of exploits are hackers for hire. These are skilled hackers, who know they are working on the wrong side of the law, and know how to do the job, take the money, and run. This situation has developed because organized crime has discovered the Internet, and the relatively easy money to be made via Internet extortion and theft.

It is believed that those nations that have Cyber War organizations, maintain arsenals of exploits. But these have a short shelf-life. Nearly all exploits eventually come to the attention of the publisher that created the exploitable software, and gets fixed. Not every user applies the "patches", so there will always be some computers out there that are still vulnerable. But that makes "zero day exploits" (discovered and used for the first time) very valuable. That's because you can use these exploits on any computer with the flawed software on it. Thus it is expensive to maintain an exploits arsenal, as you must keep finding new exploits to replace those which are patched into ineffectiveness.

Most of the Internet combat so far has been done under peacetime conditions. In wartime, it's possible (especially for the United States) to cut off enemy countries from the Internet. Thus potential American foes want to maintain an official peacetime status, so the United States cannot use its ability to cut nations off (or nearly off) from the Internet, and remove easy access to American (and Western) targets. Thus the need to make attacks discreetly, so as to make it more difficult for an enemy to target stronger attacks against you, or threaten nuclear or conventional war.

Meanwhile, everyone (including the bad guys) seems to be concentrating on defense as the true extent of Internet vulnerability becomes known. So DIB Cyber Pilot might actually work, if the decision makers can be convinced of how vulnerable they are, and become truly and convincingly scared into action.


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